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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the publicly held corporation has assumed a central 
position in both the economic and political spheres of American life.
1
 
Economically, the public corporation has long acted as the key institution 
within American capitalism.
2
 Politically, the public corporation now can 
use its economic might to sway electoral outcomes as never before.
3
 
Indeed, individuals who control public firms wield more economic power 
and political power today than ever before.
4
 These truths profoundly shape 
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 1. Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
351, 372 (2011) (“Because corporations play such a vital role in the life of individuals and states, their 
governance can impact a whole host of prosaic and profound issues.”). 
 2. STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM 49 (2013) (terming the public corporation the 
“perfect capital aggregator under law” due to limited liability, perpetual investment horizon, 
centralized management, locked-in capital, and shareholder primacy).  
 3. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319, 339–40 (2010) 
(holding that the government cannot prohibit independent corporate expenditures and invalidating part 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that restricted electioneering communications). 
 4. CEO compensation, for example, continues its inexorable upward trajectory. Gary Strauss et 
al., The 0.1 Percent; Millions by Millions, CEO Pay Goes Up, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2014, at 1B 
(“2013 median [CEO] pay . . . jumped 13% to $10.5 million . . . .”). 
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American society.
5
 The power, control, and role of the public corporation 
under law and regulation, therefore, hold more importance than ever 
before.
6
 
Even though corporate law and regulation define all aspects of this 
central economic and political institution within the American system, the 
development of corporate law is impeded by a deficient pedagogy—and 
thus, to a certain degree, scholarship—that scarcely mentions the power 
and influence corporations hold. Critical voices, in particular, are excluded 
from virtually all corporate law textbooks. Many corporate law texts 
taught in law school classrooms treat the social role of the public 
corporation as a black box of corporate law pedagogy and, by extension, 
mainstream legal scholarship.
7
 Indeed, a relentless stream of legal 
scholarship challenging the law and regulation of the public firm from the 
perspective of its broader social and economic implications receives little 
to no mention in the key textbooks adopted and taught from in law schools 
today.
8
 This Article challenges the dominant corporate law master 
 
 
 5. Indeed, corporate and financial elites now constitute about half of the top .01 percent (or one 
in 10,000) of the income distribution, and virtually all of the growth over the most recent decades 
accrued to this group. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 1–13, 22–28, 
46, 48 (2010). Corporate law fuels economic inequality. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 302 (2014) (“Recent research, based on matching declared income on tax returns with 
corporate compensation records, allows me to state that the vast majority (60 to 70 percent, depending 
on what definitions one chooses) of the top 0.1 percent of the income hierarchy in 2000–2010 consists 
of top managers.”).  
 6. Modern economic and financial scholarship agrees. For instance, in recent years, experts in 
finance and financial economics have increasingly studied the importance of corporate law and 
corporate governance on firm performance and macroeconomic performance. Compare Harold 
Demsetz, The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 426 (1997) 
(stating that under “neoclassical theory” the firm is a “black box” in that its functioning is assumed to 
be optimal), with M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate Governance 
from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial 
Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12–13 (2003) (giving an overview of empirical evidence 
regarding the impact of diversity and other elements of corporate governance variation on financial 
performance).  
 7. This Article reviewed five major corporate law texts: MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. 
COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (11th ed. unabr. 2014); CHARLES R.T. 
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2014); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
(8th ed. 2013); WILLIAM KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 2012); DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS 
STRUCTURES (3d ed. 2010). 
 8. Such critical scholarship, for example, includes: Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights: Citizens 
United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law, 28 J.L. & POL. 53, 91 (2012) (arguing that 
shareholders must submit to coerced speech directed by managers under current Delaware law and 
Citizens United); john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Beyond Public/Private: Understanding 
Excessive Corporate Prerogative, 100 KY. L.J. 43, 66–74 (2011–2012) (arguing against excessive 
privatizations and corporate prerogatives); andré douglas pond cummings, Procuring “Justice”?: 
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narrative perpetuated in all of the major business law textbooks. This 
master narrative prevents law students and legal scholars from fully 
understanding and analyzing the changing nature and evolution of law and 
power in the United States. 
In challenging the status quo narrative, law students and scholars today 
must consider the fact that at the apex of the modern public firm stands the 
Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”).9 CEOs act as the new potentates in 
American society and manage their firms as “personal fiefdoms.”10 The 
pay of CEOs and senior executives at the largest firms proves their power, 
as they now command enormous salaries beyond most athletes or movie 
stars and far beyond any ordinary citizen or employee.
11
 Never before has 
the American economy produced so much for the benefit of so few—most 
of whom are corporate or financial elites.
12
 Recently, data on current 
inequality affirms that wealth gaps have again reached the historically high 
 
 
Citizens United, Caperton, and Partisan Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89, 97–99 (2010) 
(showing pernicious impact of Citizens United on judicial independence); Thuy-Nga T. Vo, To Be or 
Not to Be Both CEO and Board Chair, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 126–29 (2010) (concluding that 
combining of chairman and CEO roles contributes to excessive CEO power and diminished financial 
performance); Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. 
L. REV. 367, 414–27 (2008) (noting that class action lawsuits are necessary to assure corporate 
diversity); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director 
Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2008) (“[T]he status quo is 
not director primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production, but CEO primacy—governance by 
managers largely for their own benefit.”); Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest 
Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags In America’s Boardrooms and What To Do About It, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1613 (2004) (concluding that CEOs work to place cronies on the board of 
their firms and forgo diversity). 
 9. Legendary mutual fund founder John Bogle claims that a “pathological mutation” has 
gripped the public corporation, transmogrifying traditional “owners’ capitalism” into “managers’ 
capitalism.” JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005). 
 10. According to economist and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, American CEOs manage 
corporations as a “personal fiefdom, not for the shareholders, but for their own benefit.” In particular, 
immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2007–2009 firms “reported high profits, gave big 
bonuses, big stock options, but in fact there were huge risks buried off-balance sheet and those 
chickens have now come home to roost.” Talk of the Nation: Economists Explain ‘How to Save 
Capitalism’, NPR (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95906243. 
 11. For example, a joint study of CEO compensation at the largest firms conducted by Equilar 
Inc. “found that the median 2012 pay package came in at $15.1 million—a leap of 16 percent from 
2011.” Gretchen Morgenson, An Unstoppable Climb in C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, at 
BU1. 
 12. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 5, at 1–4 (showing how high inequality, arising largely from 
high payouts to corporate and financial elites, operated to create a rigged economic system); JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 
119–22 (2012) (economic account of the causes and consequences of high inequality with a focus on 
economic power as a tool to corrupt the political system). 
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levels last seen in the chaotic days just prior to the financial collapse of 
2008.
13
 
Even when chief executives who constitute this new economic royalty 
fail badly in their supposed primary task of shareholder wealth 
maximization, as they did during the financial market crisis of 2008, they 
are still richly paid through stock options or golden parachutes.
14
 These 
arrangements exist with the consent of their handpicked confederates on 
the Board of Directors who too often serve as nominal supervisors.
15
 Yet, 
issues of CEO power, CEO compensation, golden parachutes, and the 
crony capitalism that gives rise to board members with close affinity to the 
CEO, ostensibly supervising the CEO, get little discussion in the most 
widely used corporations textbooks today.
16
 The manifest costs of CEO 
primacy in the public firm are not mentioned at all.
17
 Today’s law students 
will become tomorrow’s business leaders, advisors, and policymakers, but 
 
 
 13. Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States 
(Updated with 2012 Preliminary Estimates) 9 Figure 3 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(archived at http://perma.cc/Z4EE-5XNH).  
 14. Recently, the former CEO of Target garnered about $55 million in severance pay after being 
ousted for a major breach in data security at that firm. Gary Strauss, Ousted Target CEO Could Collect 
$55M-Plus, USA TODAY, May 6, 2014, archived at http://perma.cc/448C-8N9F.  
 15. One infamous example: 
Stanley O’Neal, former CEO of Merrill Lynch . . . spent much of his career at Merrill Lynch 
and became CEO in 2002, presiding over the company as it began to place huge bets on 
subprime mortgages and risky derivatives that generated billions in losses, nearly sank the 
firm, and led to a takeover by Bank of America in 2008. In 2006—the year Merrill made 
many of the deals that led to its downfall—O’Neal earned $91 million, according to the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. When O’Neal resigned in 2007, Merrill gave him a 
severance package worth another $161 million. 
Rick Newman, How 11 Corporate Titans Profited After Failure, U.S. NEWS (June 29, 2011), archived 
at http://perma.cc/9N5Q-VE4R.  
 16. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 907–10 (discussing directors, the Dodd-Frank say on pay 
provision, and executive compensation in general but omitting critical analysis of the way 
compensation decisions are made); O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1171–73 (discussing 
directors, golden parachutes, and executive compensation in general but omitting critical analysis of 
the way compensation decisions are made). For a discussion of the potential biases arising from CEOs’ 
relationship with the board of directors, see Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director 
Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 248 (quoting Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Self-Interest and 
Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation: Allocators Versus Recipients, 72 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061, 1061 (1997)) (“As self-interested actors in a world of limited goods and 
opportunities, we are motivated to promote and justify resource distributions that favor us and those to 
whom we are linked by ties of kinship or group membership.”). 
 17. Joseph Stiglitz, on the other hand, traces the CEO’s power to set his or her own 
compensation to accelerating inequality, and then to a corrupted legal system and other 
macroeconomic ills associated with too much CEO power. STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 31–39, 40–41, 
66–67, 271. See also PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334 (“The most convincing proof of the failure of 
corporate governance and . . . extremely high executive pay is that when we collect data about 
individual firms . . . it is very difficult to explain the observed variations in terms of firm 
performance.”). 
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their legal education regarding corporations suffers from crucial blind 
spots. This black hole of knowledge will lead to an intolerable ignorance 
on the part of those who propose to lead on global economic issues in the 
future. 
The ability of the CEO to stack the board of directors with cultural 
clones is key to the new power of the CEO. Essentially, in most public 
corporations, management selects management under the federal proxy 
rules.
18
 The board of the public firm is a product of “homosocial 
reproduction” whereby socially important cultural traits such as gender 
and race play a decisive role in board membership.
19
 This dynamic 
contributes to the fact that the governing heights of the American economy 
continue to be the last bastion of white male supremacy.
20
 Again, despite 
important emerging critical scholarship on this fact,
21
 no major Business 
 
 
 18. Under state law, shareholders putatively select directors. In public corporations, however, 
“[b]efore directors’ elections, companies distribute proxy materials that allow shareholders who do not 
attend annual meetings to vote their shares. Typically, these proxy materials include only those 
director candidates nominated by the existing board . . . .” Recent Case, Administrative Law—
Corporate Governance Regulation—D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and 
Capricious for Inadequate Economic Analysis—Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. 
2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1088, 1088 (2012). 
 19. Lin, supra note 1, at 363 (“With regards to directors, executives often engage in ‘homosocial 
reproduction’ and select like-minded individuals to work with them and to execute their visions. Thus, 
it should not be surprising that many current and former corporate executive officers serve on 
corporate boards, even interlocking firms in their service.”). 
 20. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77, 79 (1995) (finding 
that “in firms in which CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically 
similar to the firm’s incumbent CEO” and that cultural similarity leads to higher compensation). While 
some may argue that the problem of white male domination of America’s boardrooms arises from 
recruitment difficulties or lack of sufficient candidates for board membership, others suggest more 
traditional causes of exclusion of diverse voices. According to one leader in the African American 
business community because “there is a surplus of black executive talent with sterling professional 
credentials and reputations for unmatched performance at the highest levels” the fact that “an 
overwhelming number of boards of publicly traded companies still lock African Americans out of the 
boardroom” constitutes “a detestable statement that they seek to maintain these preserves of white 
male privilege and dominance.” Black Enterprise Publishes Exclusive Registry of African Americans 
on Corporate Boards, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.blackenterprise.com/career/ 
black-enterprise-publishes-exclusive-registry-of-african-americans-on-corporate-boards/ (quoting Black 
Enterprise CEO Earl “Butch” Graves Jr.). We posit that the white male domination of the boardroom, 
whether conscious or unconscious, is simply a numerical fact. Thus, according to the latest survey 
conducted by Black Enterprise, 74 of the nation’s 250 largest public companies still have zero 
African-American directors as of May of 2014. Id. 
 21. E.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and 
Political Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 110–11, 127–29 
(2014) (arguing that allowing shareholder access to management’s proxy solicitation can enhance 
engagement and ultimately corporate legitimacy); Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access 
Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127, 157 
(2013) (finding that shareholder proxy access is valued in equity markets); Grant M. Hayden & 
Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 
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Associations textbook mentions the social realities behind the legal 
mechanisms that belie any notion of a meritocracy at the commanding 
heights of the economy. Textbooks treat this costly crony capitalism as if 
it does not exist, or as if there is no problem with the status quo.
22
 This 
failure is a critical one. 
Corporate governance failings manifest themselves in massive social 
costs and reckless risks. Consider the enormous costs of the Enron series 
of scandals in 2001-2002,
23
 the subprime debacle,
24
 or the BP oil spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico.
25 
Each of these instances demonstrates that the costs 
of misgoverned public corporations with poor risk management policies 
and procedures can reach the trillions.
26
 The key to effective corporate 
governance is to maximize the benefits of the corporate form while 
minimizing costs.
27
 This, in turn, requires a candid discussion of the role 
 
 
101, 120–22 (2012) (arguing that the decision to deny shareholders access to proxy materials for 
purpose of director elections rested upon weak law and economics). 
 22.  See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xi–xxi; O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at ix–xxiv. 
 23. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1914, 
1937–38 (2013) (describing broad externalities associated with securities fraud beyond market 
capitalization losses—including an increase in the cost of capital for even honest firms—and 
illustrating such costs through the experience of Enron’s and WorldCom’s bankruptcy in 2001–2002); 
Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom: Just How Far Have 
You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REV. 373, 377 (2007) (noting that Enron’s 14 member board included 12 
white males). 
 24. See generally Christopher J. Miller, Note, Don’t Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis: A 
Survey of Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 
(2011) (discussing cases involving securities fraud in the context of mortgage-related securities created 
during the financial crisis and noting $2.2 trillion in bank losses alone from the financial crisis). 
 25. See Joseph Karl Grant, What Can We Learn from the 2010 BP Oil Spill?: Five Important 
Corporate Law and Life Lessons, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 809, 814 (2011) (recounting the loss of over 
50 percent of BP’s market capitalization in the wake of the Gulf oil spill). BP’s losses amount to $42 
billion. Selina Williams, BP Views Higher Oil-Spill Costs as Profit Declines, MARKETWATCH (July 
30, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bp-views-higher-oil-spill-costs-as-profit-declines-2013-
07-30. The damage to the Gulf ecosystem as a result of the BP oil spill is literally incalculable. Gaia J. 
Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce Innovation to Reduce Social 
and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 140 (2012). An acoustic switch to trigger a well 
shutdown could have prevented the Deepwater Horizon blowout and costs around $500,000. Id. at 
171–72. 
 26. The governance of corporations formed a core cause of the financial crisis. See FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xviii (2011) (finding that “dramatic 
failures of corporate governance and risk management” drove the crisis) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]; 
GRANT KIRKPATRICK, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 
(OECD 2009) (finding that “to an important extent” the financial crises arose from “failures and 
weaknesses in corporate governance,” particularly in the areas of compensation incentives and risk 
management). Losses from the crisis include lost wealth of $9 trillion, and forgone GDP could 
approach $10 trillion. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS 
LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 15, 21 (2013). 
 27. See Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory 
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 316 n.23 (2007) (“[O]ptimal corporate 
governance would minimize net agency costs.”). 
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of the corporation in our economy and political system with appropriate 
critiques of manifest shortcomings.
28
 This Article seeks a more critical 
discourse regarding the public corporation and its social and political 
impact. 
Poorly governed corporations recently posed even greater problems 
than the massive economic costs exacted by the crises of recent years. The 
corporation now holds a central position in our political system—beyond 
the contemplation of any of the nation’s Founders29—and that position has 
enabled the corporation to seize new profit opportunities in important 
social realms. For example, corporations recently emerged as a prime 
political player and profiteer in America’s mass incarceration campaign.30 
Today, even education has been corporatized at some schools.
31
 Should 
profit maximizing corporations hold such key social roles such as prison 
sentry or school administrator? Are there any limits on the privatization of 
government functions through the corporation? Should the corporation be 
tethered to its original policy contemplation of fostering business 
formation and directly funding innovation? Critical corporate scholars 
 
 
 28. Traditionally, corporations were viewed with healthy skepticism and confined only to 
activities that they were specifically chartered to pursue—there were no general business corporations, 
much less corporations pursuing business traditionally left to the state or exercising constitutional 
rights. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 428 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Even ‘the notion that business corporations could invoke 
the First Amendment would probably have been quite a novelty,’ given that ‘at the time, the 
legitimacy of every corporate activity was thought to rest entirely in a concession of the 
sovereign.’”(citations omitted)). In other words, corporations possessed limited powers defined by the 
state, not constitutional rights the state could not infringe. 
 29. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 221, 265 (2011) (“[W]hile the drafters and ratifiers of the federal organic documents perhaps 
used words that if defined broadly could encompass corporations, the drafters and ratifiers did not, at 
least during the debates, use those words in a manner consistent with protecting juridical beings as real 
constitutional entities.”). 
 30. PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION ix–x (Tara Herivel 
& Paul Wright eds., 2007) (providing overview of private interests that earn profits from incarceration 
including prison managers, prison builders, prison suppliers, firms that tap into low-cost prison labor, 
transportation firms, weapons makers, and bankers and lawyers who structure prison-related deals and 
bond offerings). 
 31. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xi–xxi (ignoring privatization); O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, 
supra note 7, at ix–xxiv (same). According to recent reports: 
Critics see the newest rush to private vendors as more worrisome because school districts are 
outsourcing not just supplies but the very core of education: the daily interaction between 
student and teacher, the presentation of new material, the quick checks to see which kids have 
risen to the challenge and which are hopelessly confused. At the more than 5,500 charter 
schools nationwide, private management companies—some of them for-profit—are in full 
control of running public schools with public dollars. 
Stephanie Simon, Private Firms Eyeing Profits from U.S. Public Schools, REUTERS INDIA (Aug. 2, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/J3TL-989D.  
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wrestle with these very questions regarding the proper role of the 
corporation in our society while corporate textbooks completely ignore 
such quandaries.
32
 
This Article challenges the benign view of all aspects of corporate law 
now prevalent in most major texts in this area and, by implication, much 
of the corporate law teaching that goes on in U.S. law schools today. “Law 
schools train many of the nation’s leaders.”33 Textbooks play a central role 
in the education of law review editors for their role as gatekeepers to legal 
scholarship.
34
 And, for the business law professoriate, the content of 
corporate law textbooks effectively tethers most to very narrow 
constructions of American business law, leaving very little space for 
critical assessments in the classroom.
35
 Excessive deference to corporate 
domination and the power of the CEO marginalizes critical scholarship 
that raises uncomfortable questions for those claiming leadership over our 
economy.
36
 Critical analysis of corporate law and governance in Business 
Associations casebooks will help students and future business leaders to 
question the role of the public corporation and understand its advantages 
and limitations.  
More than ever, CEOs and the public corporations they control exert a 
decisive influence over the American economy and political system—and 
by extension society itself.
37
 The policy basis for this massive “mission 
 
 
 32. Until relatively recently, corporate law textbooks spent significant effort on the role of the 
corporations in society and early efforts to contain the corporation to limited spheres. See, e.g., 
NORMAN D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 54, 63–66 (2d ed. 1971); HARRY G. HENN & 
JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 4–12 (3d ed. 1983). 
 33. Susan Sturm, Commentary, Law Schools, Leadership, and Change, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 
49 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/RT24-QV4S. 
 34. According to Richard Posner, the student-edited law review is “not well-equipped to select, 
and through editing to improve, articles outside of the core of legal doctrinal analysis.” Richard A. 
Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 779 
(1987). 
 35. Cf. Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery 
Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1149 (2012) (concluding that the failure to include critical 
perspectives in constitutional law textbooks “will deter” teaching such perspectives and training future 
lawyers to critically question evidence).  
 36. Id. at 1148–52 (noting that accurate and balanced pedagogy as manifest in casebooks is key 
to understanding current inequities, including the subtle racism that continues to pervade U.S. society, 
and failure to teach evidence in a balanced fashion “perpetuates widespread ignorance” as well as 
“unquestioning reverence” to the Founders). 
 37. See, e.g., Janis Sarra, Class Act: Considering Race and Gender in the Corporate Boardroom, 
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1121, 1121–25 (2005) (arguing that lack of diversity of corporate boards 
exacerbates race and gender discrimination issues); Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New 
Environmentalism, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291 (2007) (assessing corporate 
leaders’ decision making and its impact on the environment); Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of 
Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457 (2002) (exploring impact of corporate 
governance on women); Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with 
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creep” is currently non-existent, or at least unarticulated.38 Largely this is 
because the natural forum for analyzing and critiquing the legal and 
regulatory changes giving rise to this reality—the basic corporations law 
school class—fails to raise or meaningfully discuss these developments.39 
This permits corporate law to veer away from fundamental values.
40
 This 
Article suggests that the black box of corporate law controversies be 
opened and that a full discussion of winners, losers, and policy underlying 
the public corporation be discussed and debated.  
Corporations constitute a key prop to a modern and dynamic capitalist 
economy. Crucially, they operate to channel passive capital into 
productive entrepreneurial and innovative conduct.
41
 In a capitalist system, 
if corporations did not exist they would need to be invented.
42
 Some 
commentators rightfully consider the public corporation to be one of the 
greatest legal innovations in history.
43
 Rather than contesting this 
assertion, this Article seeks to vindicate it by insisting upon a balanced 
critique of the proper legal and regulatory definition of the public 
 
 
Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947 (2008) (examining the impact of corporate law on poverty, the 
environment and labor). 
 38. Indeed, the Court previously has denied the corporation certain constitutional rights. See First 
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“Corporate identity has been 
determinative in several decisions denying corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a 
right to privacy . . . . Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the ‘historic 
function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.”) (citations 
omitted).  
 39. As Professor Perea aptly asks, “When did ‘thinking like a lawyer’ come to require ignoring 
important evidence . . . and avoiding rigorous analysis of the possible ramifications of that evidence?” 
Perea, supra note 35, at 1149–50. 
 40. Thirty-one years ago a leading corporate law treatise raised questions about American 
corporations and their relationship to the apartheid regime in South Africa. HENN & ALEXANDER, 
supra note 32, at 32–33. Professor Lynne Dallas’ textbook about law, policy and socioeconomics 
explores the societal impact of business, economics and corporate decision-making and would enrich a 
corporation’s course. LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH 
(2005). 
 41. See Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in America: Can Law (and 
Professionalization) Fix “Minor” Problems of Externalization, Internalization, and Governance?, 79 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 977, 978–79 (2005) (arguing that the essential elements of the modern corporation 
may maximize the flow of capital from passive investors to productive enterprises despite structural 
problems). 
 42. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A 
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA xv (2003) (“[The corporation is] the basis of the prosperity of the West and the 
best hope for the future of the rest of the world.”). 
 43. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917) (“[T]he limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of 
modern times . . . .” (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Columbia Univ., Address at the 
143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911))). 
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corporation. Because of its manifest importance, this critical approach 
seeks to perfect the corporation, particularly its deeply suboptimal 
governance frameworks.
44
  
This Article will unfold as follows: in Part II, the Article highlights the 
continued domination of corporate governance by elite white males. Next, 
in Part III, the Article will assess the impact of the new political power 
granted public firms by the federal judiciary through its decision in 
Citizens United.
45
 In Part IV, this Article will demonstrate the meaning of 
the enhanced power of CEOs. Part V will discuss the role of the 
corporation in managing prisons and public schools as an example of how 
the relaxation of traditional constraints on corporate power have combined 
for profoundly un-American outcomes: jailing citizens and educating 
children for profit. Part VI will show the economic senselessness and 
continuing reality of the Too Big To Fail (“TBTF”) corporation. 
The conclusion of the Article is that current corporate law pedagogy, as 
evinced in widely adopted and longstanding texts that are published by 
traditional law presses, avoids grappling with important issues in corporate 
law: who actually controls corporations and why; whether corporations 
should undertake traditional government functions for profit; the political 
role of the corporation; and the recent devolution of law and regulation in 
favor of corporate managers.
46
 In short, the public corporation in these 
texts stands immune from critical analysis and should simply be accepted 
as immutable. Evidence to the contrary is simply ignored.  
We concede that the list of potential topics for discussion in a Business 
Associations class is already impossibly crowded. But Business 
Associations is a survey course, and the goals in this kind of law school 
class include introducing students to a broad range of discourse about 
large and small business organizations. Sometimes, Business Associations 
professors must opt for breadth rather than depth when choosing what to 
cover. Most important, a more balanced and inclusive text gives the law 
professor who adopts it the ability to more easily choose the most 
appropriate topics and perspectives for his or her students. This can be 
 
 
 44. E.g., Thomas Piketty et al., Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three 
Elasticities, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2014, at 230 (finding that the prevalence of CEO pay for 
luck increases with lower tax rates as CEOs face greater incentives to use their power to enhance 
compensation); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public 
Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881 (1989) (arguing that proxy reform would resolve the governance 
problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control). 
 45. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 428 (2010). 
 46. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xi–xxi (failing to provide critical analysis of corporations); 
O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at ix–xxiv (same). 
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done without having to resort to supplemental reading that students 
consider onerous. The refusal to provide critical evidence and critical 
analysis skews the business law education of U.S. law students and biases 
the knowledge base of emerging lawyers and leaders. We conclude by 
proposing a critical approach to corporate law pedagogy and scholarship.  
II. THE PUBLIC CORPORATION AND WHITE MALE SUPREMACY 
Virtually absent in all leading business law texts published by 
traditional law presses is any discussion of the continuing dominance of 
white male supremacy at all leadership levels of public corporations.
47
 
This occurs even though corporations profoundly influence the social 
reality of race and class in the United States.
48
 In fact, the public 
corporation is a key engine of racial disparities in economic outcomes in 
America.
49
 Nothing illustrates this reality more powerfully than the 
subprime mortgage crisis.
50
 Most of the key players in the crisis operated 
as public corporations subject to American corporate governance laws.
51
 
Numerous official inquiries have identified defective corporate 
governance and risk management as a key cause of the subprime 
debacle.
52
  
 
 
 47. See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at v–xvii, 1080–84; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xi–
xxi; O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at ix–xxiv; see also RICHARD ZWEIGENHAFT & G. 
WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE NEW CEOS: WOMEN, AFRICAN AMERICAN, LATINO, AND ASIAN AMERICAN 
LEADERS OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES xii, xxiii (paperback ed. 2014) (showing that women and 
minorities now lead only about 10 percent of the Fortune 500 as CEOs and hold only about 25 percent 
of directorships despite comprising nearly 64 percent of the population).  
 48. For example, researchers found that tobacco firms competed to market menthol cigarettes in 
poor minority communities, and this contributed to the racialized geography of today’s tobacco-related 
health disparities. Valerie B. Yerger et al., Racialized Geography, Corporate Activity, and Health 
Disparities: Tobacco Industry Targeting of Inner Cities, J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED, 
Nov. 2007, at 10 . 
 49. Leadership positions at the top of the public corporation carry power, prestige and wealth, as 
evidenced by the fact that about half of the top .01 percent of the income distribution consists of 
corporate and financial elites. See supra note 5. CEO compensation, in particular, constitutes one of 
the few positions where compensation can soar as high as $100 million or even over $1 billion per 
annum. Strauss et al., supra note 4. 
 50. See Natasha Lennard, A Record High Wealth Gap Between Whites and Minorities, SALON 
(July 26, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/3N8Q-AAY7.  
 51. FCIC REPORT, supra note 26, at xvii (“The very nature of many Wall Street firms changed—
from relatively staid private partnerships to publicly traded corporations taking greater and more 
diverse kinds of risks.”). The FCIC highlights “stunning” corporate governance failures at AIG, 
Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae and Citigroup, each of which was a publicly traded corporation. Id. at xix. 
 52. See supra note 26. See also S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 65–68 (Comm. Print 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8BS-CC4T [hereinafter Levin-Coburn Report] (finding that Washington Mutual 
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The subprime crisis caused the most massive destruction and transfer 
of wealth in U.S. history.
53
 That wealth transfer—from Main Street 
taxpayers to Wall Street bankers, executives and investors—ultimately led 
to the highest recorded racial wealth gap in recent U.S. history.
54
 “By one 
measure, the white-to-black median wealth ratio increased from eleven to 
one in 2005 to twenty to one in 2009. By this same measure, the white-to-
Hispanic median wealth ratio increased from seven to one in 2005 to 
eighteen to one in 2009.”55 Naturally, these devastating changes in 
household wealth caused by the subprime mortgage fiasco result in fewer 
educational opportunities, less secure retirements, less economic mobility, 
and a lower quality of life in minority communities.
56
  
The financial crisis also spawned differential outcomes in income 
status. “[B]y one measure, African Americans and Hispanics as a whole 
were downwardly mobile and net losers in terms of their income status 
during the period of 2001-2011, while whites were net winners.”57 And, 
the gap between white unemployment and minority unemployment 
reached higher levels after the crisis than before the crisis.
58
 More 
Americans of color live in poverty today as a direct result. When 
compared to white Americans, twice as many Americans of color live in 
 
 
(“WaMu”) embarked on high-risk mortgage lending in early 2005, even as the bank’s own Chief Risk 
Officer stated that the condition of the housing market signifies a “bubble” with risks that “will come 
back to haunt us” and that WaMu forged ahead despite repeated warnings that the risks were 
excessive, its lending standards and risk management systems were deficient, and many of its loans 
were tainted by fraud.). The Levin-Coburn report found that WaMu was typical of home mortgage 
lenders in terms of risk. Id. at 4. 
 53. According to National Public Radio (NPR): 
[T]he proximate cause of the Great Recession was the collapse of the housing market. When 
things went south, blacks and Latinos—who had more of their family wealth wrapped up in 
housing —were absolutely throttled. Blacks lost half of their household wealth, Latinos lost 
two-thirds, and home ownership rates fell to numbers not seen since the Reagan era. 
Gene Demby, What Do We Do About America’s Racial Wealth Gap?, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Apr. 30, 
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/04/30/179907029/what-do-we-do-about-americas-
racial-wealth-gap.  
 54. See SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URBAN INST., LESS THAN EQUAL: RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN WEALTH ACCUMULATION 1 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/TDH4-PZU2. 
 55. Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849, 858 
(2013) (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS 
BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS, 7, 14 (2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4QL8-46S2). 
 56. See id. at 861–68. 
 57. Id. at 851 (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., FEWER, POORER, GLOOMIER: THE LOST DECADE OF 
THE MIDDLE CLASS, 12 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/M4B6-RPTE). 
 58. In 2011, the white unemployment rate was 7.9 percent lower than the black unemployment 
rate and 3.6 percent lower than the Hispanic unemployment rate. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2011 41 tbl.12 (2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8TG7-4PSQ. In contrast, in 2001, the white unemployment rate was 4.4 percent lower 
than the black unemployment rate and 2.4 percent lower than the Hispanic unemployment rate. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] CRITICAL CORPORATE LAW PEDAGOGY 409 
 
 
 
 
poverty.
59
 Even more troubling is the fact that 37.9 percent of African 
American children now live in poverty and 33.8 percent of Hispanic 
children live in poverty.
60
 A more economically senseless destruction of 
human capital is difficult to imagine. 
This economic inequality was no accident. Flawed corporate law, 
governance and policy played a major role.
61
 For example, executives 
were able to harvest huge gains at the expense of shareholders and the 
disempowered, as well as society in general.
62
 Predatory lenders targeted 
the most unsophisticated borrowers, who, historically, have been denied 
access to capital and credit, for noxious home loans.
63
 A Federal Reserve 
study found that predatory lenders frequently targeted less educated 
Americans.
64
 Another study by the Wall Street Journal found that of all 
subprime borrowers, 61 percent of them actually qualified for prime 
loans.
65
 The most nefarious of the subprime lending was concentrated 
largely in areas that had sizeable minority populations.
66
 The high up-front 
fees and interest costs associated with subprime loans accelerated 
executive compensation even while leading to higher borrower-default 
 
 
 59. In 2011, 12.8 percent of whites lived in poverty while 27.6 percent of blacks and 25.3% of 
Hispanics lived in poverty. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 14 tbl.3 (2012), 
available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf. 
 60. Valerie Strauss, New Census Data: Children Remain America’s Poorest Citizens, WASH. 
POST: THE ANSWER SHEET BLOG (Sept. 17, 2013, 5:26 PM), archived http://perma.cc/KJW5-29ZF 
(“Those hardest hit are children of color: 37.9 percent of black children lived in poverty in 2012, and 
33.8 percent of Hispanics did as well. Compare that to 12.3 percent for white, non-Hispanic 
children.”). 
 61. See PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 302. 
 62. We were warned, albeit not through corporate law casebooks. No less an authority than Fed 
Chair Alan Greenspan stated in 2002, in reference to the Enron scandals, that CEOs would seek to 
harvest gains without respect to shareholder value. FED. RESERVE BOARD’S SEMIANNUAL MONETARY 
POL’Y REP. TO THE CONG. (July 16, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/4XQB-MREA (testimony of 
Chairman Alan Greenspan) (stating that lax corporate governance law contributed to CEO primacy 
and permitted CEOs to “harvest“ illicit gains through manipulation of stock prices).  
 63. Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure 
Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 168 n.128 (2009) (“The mortgage foreclosure crisis was driven not 
by lending to poor people, but by lending to poor people with terms designed to extract short term 
profits through abusive fees.”). 
 64. See generally Kristopher Gerardi et al., Financial Literacy and Subprime Mortgage 
Delinquency: Evidence from a Survey Matched to Administrative Data (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Working Paper No. 2010-10, Apr. 2010), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/pubs/wp/ 
wp1010.pdf. 
 65. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 66. Elvin Wyly et al., Cartographies of Race and Class: Mapping the Class-Monopoly Rents of 
American Subprime Mortgage Capital, 33 INT’L J. URBAN & REGIONAL RES. 332, 339–40 (2009) 
(finding that subprime lending was concentrated in areas with high prime loan rejection rates and areas 
of historic minority marginalization such as the Texas border area). 
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levels.
67
 Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that much of the crisis was 
rooted in widespread race-based subprime lending to non-subprime 
borrowers of color.
68
 
All the while, corporations and their executives profited from this 
subprime lending. Take Countrywide Financial Corp., for example. 
Countrywide paid CEO Angelo Mozilo $102 million in 2006 and $229 
million in 2007, including $127 million that Mozilo reaped from 
exercising stock options in 2007, the same year that Countrywide 
announced massive mortgage losses.
69
 The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (“FCIC”), a congressionally authorized commission charged 
with investigating the financial crisis, found that as early as 2006, Mozilo 
termed Countrywide’s subprime loans “poison” and “toxic,” and stated 
they were likely to lead to bankruptcy.
70
 Countrywide ultimately settled 
predatory lending claims for $8.4 billion, the largest predatory lending 
settlement in history.
71
 Meanwhile, Angelo Mozilo and others settled 
securities fraud claims with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) for over $70 million—essentially for selling shares to the 
investing public without disclosing the “poisonous” lending at 
Countrywide.
72
 Mozilo, however, personally only paid $22.5 million of 
 
 
 67. High-cost subprime loans default at eight times the default rate on prime loans, even after 
controlling for credit characteristics. CLAUDIA COULTON ET AL., CTR. ON URBAN POVERTY & CMTY. 
DEV., PATHWAYS TO FORECLOSURE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF MORTGAGE LOANS, CLEVELAND 
AND CUYAHOGA COUNTY, 2005-2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://blog.case.edu/msass/2008/06/23/ 
Pathways_to_foreclosure_6_23.pdf. 
 68. For example, a recent study found: 
Consistent with previous research, blacks and Latinos were more likely and Asians less likely 
to receive subprime loans than whites were. Income was positively associated with receipt of 
subprime loans for minorities, whereas the opposite was true for whites. When expensive 
(jumbo) loans were excluded from the sample, regressions found an even stronger, positive 
association between income and subprime likelihood for minorities, supporting the theory 
that wealthier minorities were targeted for subprime loans when they could have qualified for 
prime loans. 
Jacob W. Faber, Racial Dynamics of Subprime Mortgage Lending at the Peak, 23 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 328, 329 (2013). See also RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 147–51 (collecting studies). 
 69. James L. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Its Linkages to Corporate 
Governance, 5 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 295, 296–97 (2008). 
 70. FCIC REPORT, supra note 26, at 20. 
 71. Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
2008, at B1. 
 72. Press Release, SEC, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever 
Financial Penalty Against a Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3YC3-A5V2 (noting that the SEC settled based upon allegations that Mozilo (and 
others) “failed to disclose to investors the significant credit risk that Countrywide was taking on as a 
result of its efforts to build and maintain market share” and that “Mozilo engaged in insider trading in 
the securities of Countrywide by establishing four 10b5-1 sales plans in October, November, and 
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the settlement.
73
 The Mozilo and Countrywide fraud demonstrate the 
flawed legal structure of the public firm that permitted, even facilitated, 
the ability of CEOs and other senior executives to profit mightily from 
predatory and race-based lending while defrauding the public.
74
  
What would have happened if corporate leadership in America 
embraced and reflected diversity? Could these kinds of catastrophic losses 
for society, communities of color, and shareholders have been averted? 
Recent empirical studies demonstrate that firms with diverse boards 
suffered fewer subprime losses during the mortgage meltdown.
75
 Still, 
despite evidence that meaningfully diverse boardrooms improve corporate 
governance and bestow significant financial benefits,
76
 the apex of 
corporate leadership remains a bastion of white male supremacy.
77
 
A survey of the demographic make-up of corporate leadership reveals 
continued white male privilege rather than the operation of competitive 
meritocracy.
78
 Fifty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
79
 which 
formally outlawed racial and gender discrimination, the commanding 
heights of the American economy still look more like an old boys’ club 
 
 
December 2006 while he was aware of material, non-public information concerning Countrywide’s 
increasing credit risk”).  
 73. Walter Hamilton & E. Scott Reckard, Angelo Mozilo, Other Former Countrywide Execs 
Settle Fraud Charges, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/58U7-YKGU.  
 74. See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck: After the Losses, Who Shares the 
Pain?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at BU1 (“Executives at seven major financial institutions that have 
collapsed, were sold at distressed prices or are in deep to the taxpayer received $464 million in 
performance pay since 2005” even while their shareholders suffered staggering losses). 
 75. E.g., Maureen I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board Configuration Matter? The 
Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L. REV. 405, 405 (2011) (“We find 
that the board configurations of those financial institutions that engaged in subprime lending were 
significantly different from those that did not. Specifically, subprime lenders had boards that were 
busier, had less tenure and were less diverse with respect to gender.”); Marion Hutchinson et al., Who 
Selects the ‘Right’ Directors? An Examination of the Association Between Board Selection, Gender 
Diversity and Outcomes, 55 ACCT. & FIN. (forthcoming 2015) (finding that Australian companies with 
“greater gender diversity moderate[d] excessive firm risk which in turn improve[d] firms’ financial 
performance”).  
 76.  See RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 145–47 (citing authorities which find diversity improves 
boardroom performance). 
 77. As will be discussed in the next section the problem is essentially that CEOs exercise too 
much control over the public firm’s proxy solicitation, which they continue to use to control board 
composition and indirectly their compensation. See Ramirez, supra note 8, at 1600–12 (collecting 
authorities that demonstrate link between director and CEO affinity and compensation); Richard Clune 
et al., The Nominating Committee Process: A Qualitative Examination of Board Independence and 
Formalization, 31 J. CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 748 (2014) (finding that CEOs continue to exercise 
influence over director nominations notwithstanding nominally independent nominating committees). 
 78. See generally ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES: WOMEN AND MINORITIES 
ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS (2013), available at http://theabd.org/2012_ABD%20Missing_Pieces_ 
Final_8_15_13.pdf.  
 79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6 (2006 & Supp. V. 2011). 
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than a thriving modern capitalistic meritocracy.
80
 Only a genuine or 
unintended belief in white male supremacy can ignore the fact that 
meaningful racial, gender, or worldview diversity has failed to take hold in 
the modern corporate governance of the public firm.
81
  
For example, according to one recent survey, males hold over 80 
percent of Fortune 100 board seats and whites hold nearly 85 percent of 
such seats.
82
 At Fortune 500 firms these numbers increase to nearly 85 
percent and 87 percent, respectively.
83
 Progress for women and minorities 
on this front continues at a glacial pace, as women and minorities 
accounted for only 26.7 percent of all seats in 2012 at Fortune 500 firms, 
barely more than the 25.5 percent seen in 2010.
84
 Women and minorities 
continue to be dramatically underrepresented at all leadership levels of the 
world’s most powerful public corporations.85 
While public firms in the U.S. lag, diversity in the boardroom 
commands the attention of lawmakers in other parts of the world. For 
example, in 2003, Norway imposed quotas requiring that women occupy 
40 percent of the board seats of public firms.
86
 Other countries followed 
suit shortly thereafter.
87
 The EU proposed a directive in 2012 requiring 
that 40 percent of non-executive directors on corporate boards be female 
by January 1, 2020.
88
 Diversity in the boardroom, thus, is a global issue. 
 
 
 80. See Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys’ Network Still Rules Corporate Boards, USA TODAY, Nov. 
1, 2002, at 1B (quoting Stephen Baum, CEO of Sempra Energy, that board diversity “provides 
diversity of opinion and a different perspective. It causes us to think a little more. The quality of our 
decision-making is better. If we were all right-wing Republicans, we might miss opportunities.”). 
 81. Professor Cheryl Wade states the reality well: 
[C]orporate diversity discussions are misleading because they imply that companies work 
hard to ensure race and gender equity. . . . The implied contextual message, however, is that it 
may be true that many men and whites are promoted more frequently and earn more, but 
these decisions are based on merit. The implication is that even with diversity training, 
diversity officers, and codes of conduct that prohibit discrimination, whites and males climb 
to the top of the corporate hierarchy anyway. It is an implied message of white male 
supremacy. 
Cheryl L. Wade, Transforming Discriminatory Corporate Cultures: This Is Not Just Women’s Work, 
65 MD. L. REV. 346, 349, 372 (2006). 
 82. ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 78, at 2 fig.1. 
 83. Id. at 7 fig.7. 
 84. Id. at 7. 
 85. According to the most recent census data, non-Hispanic whites now constitute only 63 
percent of the U.S. population and are declining. Hope Yen, Census: White Majority in U.S. Gone by 
2043, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/W593-M4PW. Thus, white males 
constitute only about 30 percent of the general population but hold nearly 75 percent of the board 
seats. 
 86. Fawn Lee, Note, Show Me the Money: Using the Business Case Rationale to Justify Gender 
Targets in the EU, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1471, 1488 (2013). 
 87. Id. at 1492–94. 
 88. Id. at 1494–96. 
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Lawmakers in the U.S. recently acted to encourage diversity on 
corporate boards, among senior executives, and in the corporate world in 
general. In 2009, the SEC imposed disclosure requirements on public 
firms to state the role of diversity in the board nomination process.
89
 More 
recently, federal banking regulators in the U.S. released a joint rulemaking 
initiative requiring virtually all financial institutions to embrace diversity 
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act
90
 (“Dodd-Frank Act”).91 These recent legislative and regulatory 
changes supplement already-existing anti-discrimination law that 
indirectly encourages business leaders to embrace diversity.
92
 
Lawmakers undertook these initiatives as a result of increased 
acceptance of a business rationale in support of diversity.
93
 Diversity 
extends greater informational elaboration to firms.
94
 More diverse boards 
can draw upon distinct perspectives and experiences.
95
 As a result, 
 
 
 89. SEC Diversity Disclosure Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2011); Proxy Disclosure 
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (requiring disclosure of diversity policies in 
corporations). 
 90. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 91. Proposed Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the 
Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment, 78 
Fed. Reg. 64052 (Oct. 25, 2013). See also Dodd-Frank Act § 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5452(a)(1)). 
 92. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding that “an employer is 
vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative 
defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim”). 
Naturally, policies that impose and enforce an obligation to embrace diversity upon all employees 
would satisfy the affirmative defense articulated in Faragher. See El-Bakly v. Autozone, Inc., No. 04 
C 2767, 2008 WL 1774962 at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“Given the law in this area, the Court agrees that 
the signed diversity mission statements are relevant to a potential affirmative defense for Defendant 
AutoZone, because they might support a finding that Defendant AutoZone exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly the harassing behavior.”). 
 93. E.g., Toyah Miller & María del Carmen Triana, Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom: 
Mediators of the Board Diversity—Firm Performance Relationship, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 755, 755 
(2009) (finding in a sample of Fortune 500 firms “a positive relationship between board racial diversity 
and both firm reputation and innovation. We find that reputation and innovation both partially mediate 
the relationship between board racial diversity and firm performance. In addition, we find a positive 
relationship between board gender diversity and innovation.”); Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of 
Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102, 102 (2003) 
(“Correlation and regression analyses indicate board diversity is positively associated with these 
financial indicators of firm performance.”). 
 94. Of course, cognitive diversity and information elaboration is not limited to diverse cultural 
perspectives or experiences associated with race or gender. See, e.g., Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers 
and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413 (2014) (finding that lawyer-
directors add diversity to the board, give the board access to more elaborate information, and thereby 
add value). 
 95. Miller & del Carmen Triana, supra note 93, at 775 (“These findings suggest that firms may 
benefit from the diverse human and social capital on diverse boards . . . because racial and gender 
diversity (proxies for richness of information in the decision-making process) are both related to 
innovation.”) (citations omitted). 
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diversity enjoys a powerful association with innovation.
96
 Diversity 
logically operates to effectively counter groupthink as well as affinity bias 
and thereby proves to be particularly relevant in the boardroom.
97
 More 
diverse groups often hold dissimilar views, even on basic issues such as 
risk.
98
 Although, as might be expected, evidence is not uniform, there is 
strong empirical evidence that supports the tangible business benefits of 
diversity in the boardroom.
99
 
Notwithstanding the empirical strength of the business case for 
diversity in the boardroom, mainstream corporate law casebooks ignore 
the issue altogether.
100
 Finance and economics scholars research and write 
about diversity, and many reports support diversity in the corporate 
boardroom. However, the authors and publishers of mainstream casebooks 
simply omit this discourse.
101
 The authors of these texts overlook the 
actions of the SEC,
102
 the federal banking authorities,
103
 Congress,
104
 and 
other lawmaking bodies to improve diversity in U.S. corporate 
boardrooms and the public sector.
105
 The leading corporate law texts 
 
 
 96. Mariateresa Torchia et al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to 
Critical Mass, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 299 (2011) (conducting tests on 317 Norwegian firms and 
finding “that attaining critical mass—going from one or two women (a few tokens) to at least three 
women (consistent minority)—makes it possible to enhance the level of firm innovation.”). 
 97. Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity 
Rationale, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 594 (2011) (“This Article proposes that greater worldview 
diversity on corporate boards may lead to better governance and mitigate bias and unfairness in 
corporate decision making.”). 
 98. Id. at 610 (citing Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining 
the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 466 (2007)). 
 99. Compare CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE 12 (2012) (finding enhanced board diversity was associated with a 26 percent gain in 
corporate valuation from 2005 to 2012), with Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 433–34 (2008) 
(discussing gaps in empirical evidence of business benefits). Diversity gains seem particularly robust 
when a board achieves a critical mass of diverse directors rather than just tokenism. E.g., Jasmin 
Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a 
“Critical Mass?”, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61 (2013) (finding evidence that critical mass of gender 
diversity is associated with higher financial performance). 
 100. See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 1470–71, 1472, 1482 (failing to mention diversity or 
demographic characteristics of board or management in index); O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 
7, at 1169–75 (same); CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1157–1170 (same); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 895–928 (same); EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 635–39 (same). 
 101. See Fields & Keys, supra note 6.  
 102. See supra note 89. 
 103. See supra note 91. 
 104. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 342 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5452(a)(1)). 
 105. Not one of the leading texts studied even mentions the word diversity either in the context of 
the corporate boardroom or as important from a profit maximizing perspective. See EISENBERG & 
COX, supra note 7, at 1470, 1485; CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1160–61; O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, 
supra note 7, at 1169–1175; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 147–57; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 
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certainly need not accept uncritically the benefits of diversity; but 
completely ignoring the debate as if it is nonexistent does a disservice to 
both law students and a society mired in racial privilege and 
disempowerment.
106
 Indeed, these texts implicitly accommodate the racial 
pseudo-science of yesteryear that white male domination is not just 
acceptable but natural and unworthy of critique or analysis.  
While each of the leading corporate casebooks disregards critical 
assessment of corporate leadership and diversity goals, there are some 
meager exceptions. To its credit, the Choper text Cases and Material on 
Corporations at least acknowledges that the boardrooms of public firms in 
America may be culturally monolithic.
107
 But even Choper fails to discuss 
any reason for this continued exclusion of diverse voices from the 
boardroom or critically examine why this remains true in the modern U.S. 
economy.
108
 Students are given no context for this homogeneity, no 
evidence demonstrating the benefits of diversity, and are essentially 
invited to conclude that white male supremacy is simply the natural order 
of American society.
109
 At the very least there is a manifest failure of the 
primary business law text authors to voice any objection to the continued 
over-representation of white males in the boardroom.
110
 
 
 
895–928. Compare this absence of discussion with the actual approach of the financial world. 
Barclay’s recently launched an investment fund that seeks to capitalize upon the financial edge 
enjoyed by diverse firms. Michael Leibel, Barclays Launches Women in Leadership Index and ETNs, 
REUTERS (July 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YAA5-JW9W.  
 106. As Professor Wade highlights:  
 In the business setting, the equitable treatment of women and people of color depends on 
the commitment of corporate officers, directors, managers, and senior executives, almost all 
of whom are white and male. In spite of the difficulties inherent in discussing racism and 
sexism, it is important that the discourse not occur among women and people of color only. 
Whites and men must participate, and the discourse should start in law-school classes about 
business and corporate governance. 
Cheryl L. Wade, Teaching Gender as a Core Value in Business Organizations Class, 36 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 545, 549 (2011). 
 107. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 10 (stating that boards remain populated “primarily” by 
white males). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Progressive corporate law scholars have long argued that the continuation of white male 
supremacy at the apex of the public corporation is totally without justification and that diversity is 
associated with a variety of business justifications. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE 
TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 151 
(2007) (“The scarcity of women in corporate governance roles is curious, because women have been 
entering the professional and managerial ranks in great numbers for nearly three decades now.”); Lisa 
M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 884 
(2011) (“However, the empirical evidence suggests that the increased reliance on the business case has 
not translated into any appreciable gains in board diversity. Instead, there has been a relative 
stagnation in board diversity efforts even as more corporations and regulators appear willing to 
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The Klein text Business Associations: Cases and Materials on Agency, 
Partnership, and Corporations, arguably the most widely adopted 
Business Associations textbook on the market, makes no mention of 
diversity or the fact that board and executive leadership is dominated by 
privileged white males.
111
 By ignoring this important corporate 
governance issue, the Klein authors leave law professors who adopt their 
text completely adrift on this matter, forcing them to manufacture 
meaningful classroom conversation in connection with diversity in the 
boardroom and its proper place in corporate governance policymaking.
112
 
Most professors using this text are forced to leave the subject 
unconsidered and students uninformed.  
The O’Kelley business law text, Corporations and Other Business 
Associations: Cases and Materials, potentially opens a door to concrete 
discussion of board and executive makeup in connection with race and 
gender, but then slams the door abruptly by eschewing the opportunity to 
critically assess the monolithic makeup of corporate leadership.
113
 
Disappointingly, the text pays only passing lip service to gender diversity 
by describing the CEO as “she” when differentiating between officers and 
directors, no doubt well understanding that only 22 of Fortune 500 CEOs 
(4 percent) are female.
114
 The text, however, provides no further critical 
analysis as to why the corporate boardrooms and corner offices continue to 
be dominated by entrenched white males in the United States.
115
 
None of the other leading corporations’ texts mentions the domination 
of white males at the apex of the public firm, the potential benefits of 
cultural and worldview diversity, or the manifest costs of the corporations’ 
presumed racially neutral structures.
116
 Exacerbating the problem of white 
 
 
rhetorically embrace the business case.”); Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Corporate Boardroom: Still a 
Male Club, 33 J. CORP. L. 665, 679–80 (2008) (“Too often, directors follow the path of least resistance 
and nominate their acquaintances with whom they feel comfortable and these candidates necessarily 
often resemble the incumbent directors in terms of gender, race, social status, background, and 
experience.”); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1233, 1241 (2003) (arguing that diversity can stem groupthink which arises from homogeneity). 
 111. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 907–09. 
 112. Law professor adopters of Klein are seemingly forced to shoehorn considerations of board 
diversity into existing text sections on board duties (Chapter 5), including perhaps the duty of care. 
One can imagine how this results in awkward syllabus construction and, at many times, leaves students 
with the false impression that the subject is unimportant or ultra vires for purposes of corporate law 
study. This has been the experience of two authors of this Article, and likely countless law professors 
around the country. 
 113. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 150–51. 
 114. ZWEIGENHAFT & DOMHOFF, supra note 47, at xii. 
 115. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 151. 
 116. See supra note 100. 
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male domination in the corporate boardroom is the new electioneering 
power granted this powerful, but culturally monolithic, group by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Citizens United. Indeed, the upper 
echelons of the public corporation may well qualify as one of the most 
enduring bastions of white male supremacy in the U.S. 
III. CITIZENS UNITED AND THE NEW POLITICAL POWER OF THE PUBLIC 
FIRM 
On January 10, 2010, the United States Supreme Court rendered its 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
117
 The Court 
ruled that corporations enjoy the same free speech rights as individuals, 
and therefore, governmental restrictions on a corporation’s political speech 
must survive strict scrutiny, the most demanding level of judicial review 
of governmental actions.
118
 More specifically, the Court held that 
corporations are entitled to first amendment free speech protections, and as 
a result, corporate money spent on political electioneering independent of 
a campaign cannot be limited by campaign finance restrictions.
119
 
Previously, corporate funds could not be used for electioneering purposes, 
forcing CEOs and corporate leaders to finance politicking for their chosen 
candidates from their own capital (typically through Political Action 
Committees (“PACs”)).120 Now, CEOs and corporate leadership can 
essentially use corporate monies in an unfettered manner to campaign for 
and help elect the political candidates of their choice.
121
  
 
 
 117. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 342–43. 
 119. Id. at 372 (holding 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s restriction of corporate independent electioneering 
expenditures unconstitutional). The Court ultimately overruled two of its precedents on this point. Id. 
at 365–66. The statutory section found unconstitutional was part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 
47 U.S.C). 
 120. See generally Bret Shaw, Note, It’s the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine): 
How Comparative Campaign Finance Suggests that Citizens United May Not Be the End of the 
World . . . and that the United States Should Consider Other Policy Alternatives, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 159, 161–64 (2014) (describing the evolution of regulating corporate political activity). 
 121. Shareholders have no power to influence the management of the corporation under state law 
and are generally limited to voting for directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) 
(“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011) (“[A]n 
annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors . . . .”). High profile corporate 
law experts almost immediately attacked the Court’s decision because it misapprehended the nature of 
the corporation as an instrument of public policy with no inherent powers not ceded by the state for 
public purposes. See, e.g., Robert A.G. Monks, Corporate Governance Redux in the Light of Citizens 
United, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 7, 2010, 9:24 AM), archived at 
http://perma.cc/JG2T-9YL5. 
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This change in law represents a massive transfer of political power 
from ordinary citizens to the CEOs of the most colossal capital 
aggregations in the history of the world.
122
 Modern public corporations in 
America hold value approaching $20 trillion.
123
 One U.S. Senator stated 
that the Citizens United ruling has moved the U.S. toward an economic 
and political oligarchy whereby a small handful of “billionaire families” 
control the economy and political system.
124
 Another former Senator 
reflected upon the scale of resources available to public corporations and 
described the decision’s implications as “scary.”125 A leading election law 
scholar called the day the opinion was issued “a very bad day for 
American democracy.”126 
CEOs’ power over the political activities of the corporation is now 
unlimited. Surprisingly, there is no mandatory disclosure obligation of a 
public firm’s political activities.127 There is no enforceable mandate that 
the CEO consider shareholder interests when deploying for political ends 
the extraordinary capital available to the public firm.
128
 It is virtually 
 
 
 122. See Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical 
Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 316 (2014) (“Indeed, during the 2012 
federal election cycle, independent spending related to all federal races exceeded $1 billion, which was 
approximately three times more than spending in 2008 and approximately six times more than 
spending in 2004.”). Professors Spencer and Wood examined those states whose election laws were 
most affected by Citizens United. They found that independent corporate electioneering expenditures 
in state elections since Citizens United doubled. Id. at 361 (“[W]e . . . systematically examined the 
effect of [Citizens United] on spending at the state level. We found that independent spending 
increased at twice the rate in states whose laws were affected by the decision.”). 
 123. The current total market value of publicly traded firms in the US amounts to $19.8 trillion. 
WILSHIRE, THE WILSHIRE 5000 TOTAL MARKET INDEX: FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS, 
http://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/T5MS-DXRK.  
 124.  Natasha Bach, Bernie Sanders: Citizens United Is Creating An ‘Oligarchic Form Of 
Society’, HUFF. POST (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:04 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/5Q95-KN97.  
 125. Bob Kerrey, The Senator from Exxon-Mobil?, HUFF. POST (Mar. 23, 2010, 5:12 AM), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8BEP-R5W3 (“With $85 billion in profits during the 2008 election, Exxon 
Mobil would have been able to fully fund over 65,000 winning campaigns for U.S. House or outspend 
every candidate by a factor of 90 to 1. That’s a scary proposition when you consider that the health of 
our planet is at stake.”). 
 126. Rick Hasen, Citizens United: What Happens Next?, HUFF. POST (Mar. 23, 2010, 5:12 AM), 
archived at http://perma.cc/JX92-VMGB.  
 127. Delaware law fails to even authorize political expenditures much less regulate them. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011) (detailed listing of corporate powers without authorizing political 
contributions and activities). 
 128. At best, the campaign expenditures and political activity of a CEO is subject to review only 
under the very promiscuous business judgment rule, which only imposes fiduciary duty liability for 
gross negligence—meaning egregious, near intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (imposing liability upon finding that the CEO negotiated sale of company 
without authority from board, settled upon a price without basis and without expert analysis, signed 
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impossible for shareholders to hold corporate leaders accountable in this 
context, even if executives put their personal interests before those of the 
corporation and its shareholders. In order to enforce fiduciary duties owed 
to the corporation, a shareholder must proceed derivatively and can 
generally only do so upon a showing of bad faith.
129
 Indeed, state law 
provisions that effectively abolished the duty of care for most public 
corporations fail to provide means to hold directors accountable even 
when they act recklessly.
130
 These statutes typically require a showing of 
“conscious disregard” of duty.131 Thus, the Supreme Court through 
Citizens United expanded the power of CEOs, already insulated under 
statutory law, to use shareholder wealth—and to thereby coerce 
shareholder speech—to further management’s political goals with little or 
no accountability.
132
 
In fact, while state law generally takes great care to delineate the power 
of the corporation, those powers generally do not include the power to 
 
 
merger agreement without reading document, and failed to assure that board conditions to transaction 
were properly secured).  
 129. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (“Accordingly, we hold that the 
Court of Chancery properly . . . dismissed the plaintiffs’ derivative complaint for failure to excuse 
demand by alleging particularized facts that created reason to doubt whether the directors had acted in 
good faith in exercising their oversight responsibilities.”); Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, , 1044, 1054 n.37 (Del. 2004) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
815 (Del. 1984) (“[I]n the demand context even proof of majority ownership of a company does not 
strip the directors of the presumptions of independence, and that their acts have been taken in good 
faith and in the best interests of the corporation. There must be coupled with the allegation of control 
such facts as would demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden 
to the controlling person.”)) (dismissing derivative action). 
 130. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (authorizing an exculpatory provision in a 
corporation’s articles of incorporation for money damages for “acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law”). See also Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2000) (finding that 98% of 
sampled Fortune 500 companies that incorporated under state laws that permit insulation of directors 
for duty-of-care liability had adopted insulating charter provisions, and that 100% of Delaware firms 
sampled had adopted such provisions). 
 131. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63, 67 (Del. 2006) (holding that a 
“conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities” shows bad faith for purposes of director liability).  
 132. See discussion of CEO primary infra Part IV. See also Miller, supra note 8, at 91. In his 
opinion, Justice Stevens articulated the point: 
 It is an interesting question “who” is even speaking when a business corporation places 
an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the 
customers or employees, who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically be 
said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of the 
firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or 
directors of the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking . . . . 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 467 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
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influence politicians and elections.
133
 Only the U.S. Supreme Court 
endows these artificial legal fictions with such power.
134
 Historically, the 
corporation existed as a matter of the state’s imperative to facilitate 
macroeconomic growth.
135
 This implied concentrated economic power, 
and legislatures exercised caution accordingly, limiting the power of the 
corporation by imposing limits on its duration, number of shareholders, 
capitalization, and powers.
136
 There is no evidence, however, that at the 
framing of the U.S. Constitution anyone contemplated that the corporation 
would act as a key political player that is controlled almost entirely by the 
CEO.
137
  
Noted constitutional law scholars have raised important objections to 
allowing CEOs to plumb shareholder wealth to fund their political 
objectives.
138
 They note that the Supreme Court’s expansion of the power 
of corporate managers to use shareholder wealth for management’s 
political agenda is at odds with the Court’s insistence that unions be 
deprived of the same power with respect to union members.
139
 These 
scholars also recognize that the Court could have easily resolved the 
compelled speech issue with respect to shareholders simply by mandating 
institutional assurances that shareholders have some voice in the 
expenditure of their wealth by corporate leadership for political 
 
 
 133. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011). 
 134. Leading texts of decades past wrestled only with the charitable donations that corporations 
made and did not contemplate them as political actors. LATTIN, supra note 32, at § 64. Indeed, the 
nature of the historic roots of the corporation was that the sovereign dispensed concessions to the 
corporation as its creator and that these could contravene constitutional rights. Id. § 174–75. 
 135. Thus, corporations existed in England and the American colonies to generate revenue for the 
government and assist in the creation of infrastructure such as bridges, roads, ferries, wharfs, banks, 
water suppliers and other basic public goods. Id. § 175.  
 136. Id. § 54. 
 137. Prior to the Constitution only about 30 special purpose corporations even existed in the 
American colonies. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 24. General incorporation statutes did not 
appear until 1795 (with many restrictions) and broad general business corporations did not exist until 
the late 19th century. Id. at 24–27. See also Carol R. Goforth, “A Corporation Has No Soul”—Modern 
Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 
617, 659 (2010) (“Given the accepted notion that the Framers were indeed concerned with individual 
rights, they never would have contemplated giving [modern public corporations] free speech rights.”).  
 138. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights 
After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2013) (“When the Supreme 
Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that corporations have a First Amendment right to make 
unlimited, independent campaign expenditures, it dismissed in a few sentences the idea that the 
corporate leadership’s use of corporate resources on politics might infringe the rights of dissenting 
shareholders.”). 
 139. Id. at 1026 (“The dissimilar treatment of unions as compared to almost all other organizations 
for purposes of the compelled speech restriction on associational free speech rights cannot be justified 
by law or logic.”). 
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purposes.
140
 Instead, the Court’s mandate that state-created artificial 
entities enjoy First Amendment speech rights to spend shareholder money 
for electioneering simply shifted massive political power to CEOs.  
The Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United invited leading 
corporate law scholars to address the issue of compelled speech of 
shareholders and the crafting of innovative structural adaptations to 
address this issue. Some scholars answered the call admirably.
141
 These 
commentators urge more robust accountability of managers, under 
traditional fiduciary duties, for political expenditures.
142
 Fundamentally, 
however, the issue is a more urgent incarnation of a longstanding 
corporate governance and shareholder concern: “how to ensure that [a] 
corporation[‘s] political activities are actually in the interest of 
shareholders.”143 
Consider the observations made in the preceding paragraphs along with 
the dearth of women or minority leaders who are CEOs or on boards of 
Fortune 500 companies. It becomes clear that the new political and 
economic power granted to CEOs and boards by Citizens United is simply 
a grant of additional power to entrenched white males and the white male 
perspective that has dominated economic policy in the United States for so 
long.
144
 Put simply, the Supreme Court transferred power from the diverse 
body politic as a whole to a small handful of non-diverse corporate elites. 
Consider also one disturbing example of a CEO’s abuse of the power 
given to corporate executives under Citizens United. The CEO of Massey 
Coal in West Virginia hand-picked a West Virginia Supreme Court 
judicial candidate, used corporate funds to see him elected, and then 
reaped the reward when that judge cast the deciding vote in a case that 
spared Massey Coal from a $50 million verdict for allegedly interfering 
 
 
 140. Id. at 1023 (“Nor does it consider what kinds of internal organizational governance 
mechanisms are necessary to ensure a fair allocation of speech protections between those who wish the 
organization to promote one message and those who wish it to promote another.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 117 (2010) (“We have put forward rules based on a combination of 
shareholder voting, oversight by independent directors, and detailed transparency requirements that 
include robust disclosure of spending through intermediaries.”). 
 142. See, e.g., William Alan Nelson II, Esq., Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative 
Claims of Corporate Waste to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J. 
134, 155–67 (2012); Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics with Shareholder Value: The Case for 
Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. L. REV. 737, 
769–73 (2012). 
 143. James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 
251, 253 (2013). 
 144. See cummings, supra note 8, at 108. 
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tortiously in a business relationship.
145
 The Citizens United decision has 
enabled CEOs to select and elect state judges who are amenable to the 
business law policies favored by the CEOs.
146
  
Most business law textbooks fail to question or even mention the 
political role of the corporation, the recent expansion of that role, the fact 
that the expansion enjoys a weak state law basis, and the implications in 
terms of CEO power arising from the expanded political role of the public 
firm. The Eisenberg text mentions the Citizens United case immediately 
following materials concerning corporate power to make charitable 
contributions, but it offers no explicit opportunity to critique or analyze 
the expansion of corporate political power.
147
 The text also raises 
corporate governance questions regarding corporate political activity but 
does not attempt to spark discussion about whether such activity is 
something that corporations should pursue.
148
 The Choper, O’Kelley, 
Epstein, and Klein texts all fail to mention or make reference to Citizens 
United.
149
 Despite multiple entry points in the current corporate law canon, 
textbooks generally ignore the political role of the corporation.
150
 These 
omissions make it difficult to have thoughtful classroom discussions on 
the proper political status of the public corporation or the role of the CEO 
in directing the prodigious spending of corporations for political purposes. 
 
 
 145. Id. at 99–102. See also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals judge should have recused himself as matter of due process 
because president and CEO of corporation appearing before him contributed some $3 million to his 
election campaign following trial court’s entry of $50 million judgment against corporation when it 
was likely that corporation would be seeking review in Supreme Court of Appeals). 
 146. See cummings, supra note 8, at 102–09; see also Michael H. LeRoy, Do Partisan Elections 
of Judges Produce Unequal Justice when Courts Review Employment Arbitrations?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
1569 (2010). 
 147. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 267. 
 148. Id. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby provides another important illustration of 
the judiciary’s acquiescence to the arguably unreasonable expansion of corporate power and influence. 
The Court held that the religious beliefs of the owners of small family-owned businesses could be 
attributed to the corporation itself. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___ (2014) (holding 
that corporations could not be compelled by law to do anything they find religiously objectionable). A 
group of corporate lawyers and professors signed onto an amicus brief explaining that this holding 
eviscerated the fundamental notion in corporate law that a corporation is an entity or person that is 
separate from its owners or shareholders. Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 
333889. 
 149. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1130; O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1164; 
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xxi; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xxiv. 
 150. See Michael D. Guttentag, Teaching Citizens United v. FEC in the Introductory Business 
Associations Course, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 163, 165–66 (2013) (arguing that Citizens United can be 
integrated into the typical Business Associations course when discussing shareholder primacy, agency 
costs between managers and owners, and when discussing the risk management role of transactional 
attorneys). 
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This kind of discussion can occur only if supplemental material is 
assigned. Thus, at a time when high-profile commentators demonstrate 
that America has devolved into an aristocracy of CEOs, students will be 
ill-equipped to assess whether the new political power of the CEO 
contributes to this new reality.
151
 
IV. CEO PRIMACY AND AMERICA’S NEW ECONOMIC ROYALTY 
Noticeably missing from all major business law texts is a discussion 
connecting the reckless mismanagement of many corporate leaders with 
the mortgage crisis of 2008. After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, many 
experts and commentators concluded that CEOs and senior executives at 
major financial firms received excessive compensation for pursuing 
reckless lending and investment activities, which led to catastrophic losses 
for the firms and huge paydays for senior executives.
152
 In fact, the head of 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), which supervises 
all national banks and federally chartered thrifts, concluded that 
underlying the entire debacle was “the worst mortgage underwriting in our 
nation’s history.”153 These reckless mortgages added huge risks to an 
already over-leveraged financial sector, meaning that small losses could 
 
 
 151. See Robert J. Samuelson, The CEO Aristocracy: Big Bucks for the Big Boss, WASH. POST, 
June 22, 2014, archived at http://perma.cc/83DM-JBZV.  
 152. E.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the 
Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 859–60 (“The financial crisis helps make the case that boards 
should do more monitoring. Corporate behavior in the crisis yielded enormous negative externalities for the 
greater society. Corporations were able . . . [to] incentivize risky behavior that yields negative externalities, 
[so] it seems appropriate that boards do more to prevent the abuse of [limited liability].”); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–
2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257–60 (2010) (finding that “the top executive teams of Bear Stearns 
and Lehman” derived billions in compensation, “exceed[ing] the value of the executives’ [stock] 
holdings at the beginning of the period,” such that “the bottom-line payoffs of these executives during 
2000–2008 were not negative but rather decidedly positive.”); Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock—
Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419–20 (2010) 
(“Too many managers appointed to protect the interests of shareholders are looting their companies. . . 
. Even in 2008, a year of shriveling corporate profits and plummeting stock prices, more CEOs saw 
pay increases than cuts. Despite the ravages of the financial crisis, average CEO pay in 2008 declined 
only modestly.”); Morgenson, supra note 74 (“Executives at seven major financial institutions that 
have collapsed, were sold at distressed prices or are in deep to the taxpayer received $464 million in 
performance pay since 2005. . . . Yet these firms have reported losses of $107 billion since 2007 . . . . 
And $740 billion in stock market value has been lost since these companies’ shares peaked in 2007, 
just before the housing bubble burst.”). 
 153. John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Remarks Before the Exchequer Club 6 (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2010/pub-speech-2010-84a.pdf (“[T]he recent financial crisis was caused by a 
number of factors . . . [including,] at the heart of it all, the worst mortgage underwriting in our nation’s 
history.”). 
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wipe out equity and lead to mass insolvency.
154
 All of this led to massive 
losses for shareholders and the economy at large.
155
 CEOs essentially 
manipulated risk to pump up short-term profits, saddling the entire 
financial sector with a very high probability of systemic failure.
156
 The 
FCIC confirmed that compensation rewarded high-risk short-term gains 
and resulted in long-term threats to firms’ financial viability.157 Little 
mention of this lethal mismanagement is included in major business law 
texts today, even though they may include extended discussions of 
compensation issues.
158
 It is as if the crisis simply did not happen, or 
corporate governance played no role—and these texts foreclose any debate 
 
 
 154. As the FCIC explains: 
By one measure, [the five major investment banks’] leverage ratios were as high as 40 to 1, 
meaning for every $40 in assets, there was only $1 in capital to cover losses. Less than a 3% 
drop in asset values could wipe out a firm. To make matters worse, much of their borrowing 
was short-term, in the overnight market—meaning the borrowing had to be renewed each and 
every day. 
FCIC REPORT, supra note 26, at xix. 
 155. Losses from the crisis include lost wealth of $9 trillion and foregone GDP could approach 
$10 trillion. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 26. 
 156. See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text. See also Raghuram Rajan, Bankers’ Pay is 
Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at 11, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage. 
ft?news_id=fto010920081142101282 (“[U]nless we fix incentives in the financial system we will get 
more risk than we bargain for. Unless bankers offer these better explanations, their enormous pay, 
which has been thought of as just reward for performance, will deservedly come under scrutiny.”); 
Paul Krugman, Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A37, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/opinion/23krugman.html?_r=0 (“Executives are lavishly 
rewarded if the companies they run seem successful: last year the chief executives of Merrill and 
Citigroup were paid $48 million and $25.6 million, respectively. But if the success turns out to have 
been an illusion—well, they still get to keep the money.”). 
 157. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 26, at xix (“Compensation systems . . . too often rewarded the 
quick deal, the short-term gain—without proper consideration of long-term consequences. Often, those 
systems encouraged the big bet—where the payoff on the upside could be huge and the downside 
limited. This was the case up and down the line—from the corporate boardroom to the mortgage 
broker on the street.”). Both the Chair of the FDIC and the Chair of the SEC concurred in this basic 
conclusion. Id. at 64 (quoting SEC Chair Mary Schapiro: “Many major financial institutions created 
asymmetric compensation packages that paid employees enormous sums for short-term success, even 
if these same decisions result in significant long-term losses or failure for investors and taxpayers.”). 
 158. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke explained just how lethal the risk manipulation was:  
As a scholar of the Great Depression, I honestly believe that September and October of 2008 
was the worst financial crisis in global history, including the Great Depression. . . . [O]ut of 
maybe the . . . 13 of the most important financial institutions in the United States, 12 were at 
risk of failure within a period of a week or two. 
Id. at 354. See also CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at xxv, 7–8, 647–49 (mentioning in short discussions 
scattered throughout the text the financial crisis as well as raising the possibility of risk manipulation 
to seek enhanced compensation and Congress’ response to the problem in the form of the Dodd-Frank 
Act); O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at xxv, 7–8, 248–49 (mentioning the financial crisis but 
failing to mention links to risk manipulation and compensation arrangements encouraging excessive 
risk). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2014] CRITICAL CORPORATE LAW PEDAGOGY 425 
 
 
 
 
on this point.
159
 The problem of excessive executive compensation and 
incentives to manipulate risk continues to plague public firms, yet the 
subject is ignored in business law texts and classrooms.  
To address the problem of excessive compensation, Congress included 
a provision within the Dodd-Frank Act that gave shareholders a “say on 
pay.”160 More precisely, the Act mandated that shareholders have an 
advisory vote on executive pay.
161
 This precatory vote, however, has not 
been an effective mechanism for controlling CEO pay.
162
 In the past two 
years since say on pay took effect, CEO pay has soared—in some cases 
exceeding $1 billion in a single year.
163
 Executive compensation now 
stands at a level that exceeds pre-crisis highs.
164
 The core problem is that 
say on pay lacks teeth—a no vote is next to meaningless. And when 
shareholders do approve high payouts it serves to encourage excessive 
pay.
165
  
Progressive corporate law scholars have argued that the “say on pay” 
rules should have been an occasion for state courts to reinvigorate state 
fiduciary duty standards as a mechanism for imposing more effective 
corporate governance.
166
 The prospects for this kind of change in any 
meaningful sense are dim at best.
167
 Instead, this modest reform seems to 
have backfired as managers use shareholder votes to justify larger pay 
 
 
 159. See, e.g., EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 730–56 (discussing compensation but not 
financial crisis); CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 131–54 (same). 
 160. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).  
 161. This was only the most recent federal effort to reign in corporate excesses. LOUIS LOSS, JOEL 
SELIGMAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 55–57 (6th ed. 2011) (historical 
overview of federal efforts to reign-in corporate excesses under the federal securities laws.). 
 162. Jesse Eisinger, Ixnay on ‘Say on Pay’, PROPUBLICA (June 26, 2013, 12:00 PM), archived at 
http://perma.cc/JXR2-9T2B.  
 163. See supra notes 4 and 11 and accompanying text. The high end of CEO pay soared to 
unprecedented levels recently, as ten CEOs made over $100 million, and two made over $1 billion. 
Dina ElBoghdady, Two CEOs Break a Billion-Dollar Record, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2013, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4J94-29AF.  
 164. Eisinger, supra note 162. 
 165. See John Carney, Why ‘Say on Pay’ Failed and Why That’s a Good Thing, CNBC (July 3, 
2013, 6:00 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/PNU6-3F3D.  
 166. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25 (2013). 
 167. The most significant corporate law jurisdiction, Delaware, continues to insist that senior 
managers of public firms hold immunity for misconduct short of intentional wrongdoing. It also seeks 
more risk in public firms while being incapable of comprehending that too much risk can pose lethal 
dangers to firms and the economy as a whole. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 
A.2d 106, 114 n. 6 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[T]he threat of personal liability may discourage beneficial risk 
taking.”). 
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packages.
168
 In sum, the say on pay effort to control perverse 
compensation incentives is a bust.
169
 
Another Dodd-Frank Act failure is the effort by Congress to reform 
proxy access so that shareholders could access management’s proxy 
solicitation to nominate directors and run candidates against 
management’s own selections.170 The SEC attempted to implement the 
power Congress expressly gave it to allow shareholders expanded proxy 
access.
171
 In Business Roundtable v. SEC,
172
 the D.C. Circuit Court held 
that the SEC’s effort to implement this part of Dodd-Frank was not valid 
because the SEC failed to perform an adequate cost-benefit analysis, and 
its rule was therefore arbitrary and capricious.
173
 Consequently, in the 
public firm today, management still selects management, meaning that 
shareholder supervision is not possible and compensation soars ever 
higher.
174
 
Despite broad consensus that perverse compensation incentives drove 
the financial crisis and the resulting Dodd-Frank legislation, corporate law 
textbooks largely ignore the links between compensation and the crisis.
175
 
For example, the Klein text declines a perfect platform to take up the issue 
of skewed corporate executive compensation when it examines Disney.
176
 
In that case, Disney shareholders sued the Disney board of directors for 
entering into an astonishing contract with former Disney President 
Michael Ovitz that turned out to pay Ovitz more money when he was 
terminated from the company without fault than it would have paid out 
 
 
 168. See Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 417, 461 (2011) (“Shareholder approval has the potential to insulate directors from criticism 
for compensation decisions, which may perversely lead directors at some firms to offer pay packages 
that are higher and less sensitive to performance than the current baseline.”). 
 169. See Eisinger, supra note 162. 
 170. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 971 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n) (2012) 
(authorizing the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule). 
 171. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,753–76 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.14a-11). 
 172. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 173. Id. at 1148 (“We agree with the petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new 
rule.”). 
 174. See supra notes 17–19. See also 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2013) (allowing management to 
exclude shareholder proposals from management’s proxy solicitation materials if the shareholder 
proposal relates to a director election). Thomas Piketty argues the ability of CEOs to set their own 
compensation (or have other CEOs set CEO pay) has caused an explosion in manager salaries leading 
to soaring inequality. PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 331–32. 
 175. See supra notes 9, 10, 152, 156 and 157. 
 176. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d sub nom., 
Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
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had he performed the life of his contract.
177
 Ovitz took home close to $130 
million for his fourteen months of service to Disney—roundly considered 
a failed tenure.
178
 Noted commentators concluded that, in the end, the 
Disney litigation resulted in yet another judicial power transfer to CEOs to 
enter into dubious compensation arrangements with other officers.
179
 
When presented with the opportunity to critically examine executive 
compensation and the perverse incentives that motivate executives to take 
excessive and reckless risks based on astonishing pay packages, the Klein 
text eschews the opportunity.
180
 Rather, the text reads as if astonishing 
executive compensation is natural, even appropriate, and board members 
are rightly protected from shareholder inquiry if an excessive pay package 
is approved by a compensation committee and compensation expert.
181
 
The message is that corporate executives deserve the hundreds of millions 
of dollars of compensation, even if their tenure is deemed a failure.  
While Klein fails to critically examine enormous executive-
compensation payouts and the attendant consequences, it does take note of 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s “say on pay” provisions to alert students to the fact 
that shareholders now have the right to take a periodic “non-binding” 
advisory vote on executive pay.
182
 In noting that Dodd-Frank tries to 
address not only “Wall Street Banks” but also corporate compensation 
generally in the United States, Klein matter-of-factly reports that “[t]he 
results of the [say on pay] vote are not binding on the board of directors. 
Indeed, the Act makes clear that the vote shall not be deemed either to 
effect or affect the fiduciary duties of directors.”183  
As the Klein text is perhaps the most widely adopted Business 
Associations textbook in the United States, thousands of law students 
annually are given no critical analysis of executive compensation as 
currently practiced in corporate America, nor are they encouraged to think 
 
 
 177. Disney, 907 A.2d at 704. 
 178. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 35. 
 179. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & Matthew D. Bivona, Disney Goes Goofy: Agency, Delegation, 
and Corporate Governance, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 230 (2008) (“The Disney case recognized Eisner’s 
unilateral actual authority to terminate without cause the company’s president, causing the issuance of 
a $130 million severance payment. This event took place with no board of director discussion or 
approval.”). The judicial grant of arguably unreasonable levels of power to CEOs is embodied in the 
court’s holding that the board of Disney acted in good faith and with no duty of care breach when they 
hired and fired Michael Ovitz. 
 180. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 374–90. 
 181. Id. at 389. 
 182. Id. at 390 (discussing Dodd-Frank pay reforms without any context regarding the financial 
crisis). This appears to be the only discussion of the financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act in Klein. 
Id. at 909. 
 183. Id. at 390. 
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about the possibility that executive compensation paradigms may have 
helped to precipitate the financial crisis.
184
 One of the most controversial 
issues in corporate law today, excessive executive compensation and its 
manifest costs, is nearly invisible in one of the most widely adopted 
business law texts on the market.
185
 Not only is the subject left 
unaddressed, but if a business law professor that uses the Klein text 
intends to examine executive compensation and the perverse incentives 
that motivate so many business leaders today, that professor is forced to 
supplement the text and bring in a significant amount of outside reading. 
This can alienate students, already burdened with significant amounts of 
work, and cause discordance for a professor who assigns materials some 
students may deem inappropriate because it is “not in the book.”  
No other mainstream business law textbook adequately considers the 
issue of excessive executive compensation insofar as the financial crisis 
and CEO power is concerned. There is a mention of excessive executive 
compensation in the Epstein text, but no serious critical consideration of it 
or link to the financial crisis.
186
 No substantial discussion at all of links 
between excessive risk-taking incentives in executive compensation and 
the financial crisis appears in the Choper text,
187
 the Eisenberg text
188
 or 
 
 
 184. Inclusion of this topic in the text (or any topic discussed herein) obviously does not mean that 
the authors of the text endorse any particular position or that these professors teach any particular 
position. Instead, it only means that students may engage in thoughtful discussion on the topic if a 
given professor deems the topic worth the time given what else must be covered. See Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Teaching Business Associations Law in the Evolving New Market Economy, 8 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 175, 190 (2013) (articulating four primary goals for the basic business organizations course: 
“(1) efficiently use available resources, (2) build from individual strengths, (3) meet institutional 
curricular and degree requirements, and (4) educate our students for the short-term and long-term 
demands of a business law or other practice in a rapidly changing legal employment and education 
setting”). With respect to the issue of the excessive compensation and the financial crisis, lawmakers, 
influential commentators and a consensus of economists concluded that excessive compensation was 
“partly responsible for the financial crisis.” John Cassidy, Wall Street Pay: Where’s the Reform?, NEW 
YORKER, July 23, 2010, archived at http://perma.cc/N2JN-F9R4. Thus, future business leaders should 
at least hold the possibility of an unencumbered discussion of the issue.  
 185. See supra note 182. 
 186. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 261–70, 311–12, 315–18 (discussing the financial crisis but 
failing to link executive compensation to excessive risk and risk manipulation). See also id. at 658 
(discussing how the business judgment rule operates to protect subprime mortgage investments in 
Delaware). 
 187. The Choper text includes a credible discussion on the power of CEOs and executive 
compensation. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 5–17, 131–35, 142–44, 533–38. Choper also footnotes 
a reference to potential director liability for investment in subprime mortgages, but with no discussion 
of the role of such lax oversight in the financial crisis of 2008. Id. at 98 n.44, 139 n.101. As previously 
demonstrated, while the Choper text does in fact mention excessive risk taking and perverse 
compensation incentives during the financial crisis, no student would have any clue that numerous 
experts and legal inquiries target these factors as a key driver of the crisis. Id. at xxv, 7–8, 647–49 
(mentioning in short discussions scattered throughout the text the financial crisis as well as raising the 
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the O’Kelley text.189 Leading corporate law professors who draft the most 
adopted business law textbooks in the country provide no assessment of 
the verdict of the FCIC, Nobel laureates, or a wide array of other 
economists that corporate law allows CEOs to pillage their firms to attain 
massive compensation payments. 
Excessive CEO compensation has now figured prominently in a series 
of corporate fiascos this century. First, in 2001–2002, a battery of public 
firms collapsed amid accounting frauds rooted in efforts by senior 
managers to increase their options-based compensation.
190
 Second, in 
2006, options back-dating emerged as another way for CEOs to take for 
themselves millions of dollars from shareholders.
191
 Third, during the 
subprime debacle, senior executives received huge incentive-based 
compensation payments for manipulating risk, even though these risks 
ultimately sank the entire financial sector and led to the Great Financial 
Crisis of 2007–2009.192 The costs of this misconduct are measured in the 
trillions.
193
 
Yet, perhaps the greatest cost of CEO dominance is not the occasional 
massive macroeconomic disruption implicit in financial crises. Instead, 
CEO primacy inflicts a daily toll on the economy in the form of 
compromised financial performance.
194
 CEOs simply hold too much 
 
 
possibility of risk manipulation to seek enhanced compensation and Congress’ response to the problem 
in the form of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 188. See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 1465, 1475.  
 189. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 325–326, 379–395. The O’Kelley text includes 
a limited discussion of the financial crisis of 2008, but no mention of perverse compensation 
incentives or risk manipulation for higher compensation. Id. at 7–8. 
 190. See generally andré douglas pond cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the 1994 
Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of 
the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979 (2005) (describing the accounting frauds at 
Enron, WorldCom, and many others resulting from corporate executives attempting to maintain high 
stock value to enhance executive compensation payouts). 
 191. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1641 (2007) (“[O]ur evidence suggests that managerial theft is not a zero-
sum game, but involves huge dead-weight losses for the shareholders.”). 
 192. See Philip Coggan, The Bonus Racket, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2009, at 79 (“In effect, 
executives and employees were given a call option on the markets by the banking system. They took 
most of the profits when the market was booming and shareholders bore the bulk of the losses during 
the bust.”). In the three years prior to the crisis, Bear Stearns paid $11.3 billion in compensation and 
benefits while the shareholders were wiped out in bankruptcy; Lehman Brothers paid $21.6 billion and 
went bankrupt; finally, Merrill Lynch paid compensation and benefits of $45 billion while its 
shareholders got $9.6 billion in Bank of America stock. Id. 
 193. See supra note 26. 
 194. See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 145 
(2003) (finding that potential gains from improvements in corporate governance “would be 
enormous”). 
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power.
195
 For example, the simple expedient of splitting the CEO position 
from the Chair of the Board results in dramatic performance gains at the 
worst performing companies.
196
 And there are other fundamental corporate 
governance matters that should be addressed and assessed in Business 
Associations casebooks. An independent risk-management committee is 
associated with superior financial performance, particularly in financial 
firms.
197
 Diverse boardrooms have also been linked to valuation gains.
198
 
Shareholders value the ability to exercise votes in a meaningful way in the 
context of shareholder access to management’s proxy for director 
elections.
199
 
The political power of CEOs is the linchpin of CEO primacy. 
Economists have modeled how CEOs are able to wield political power to 
entrench and enrich themselves at shareholder expense. These models are 
consistent with extant empirical evidence.
200
 This observation draws 
further support from the devolution of law and regulation in favor of 
managers that coincides with their runaway compensation, as discussed 
above. For example, in Delaware and most other jurisdictions, the law 
now provides for the elimination of liability for breach of the directors’ 
duty of care.
201
 This makes it less likely that boards will supervise CEOs. 
 
 
 195. Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons From the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 52 (2009). 
 196. Vo, supra note 8, at 126–29. See also Ryan Krause & Matthew Semadeni, Apprentice, 
Departure, and Demotion: An Examination of the Three Types of CEO-Board Chair Separation, 56 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 805, 805 (2013) (“In a study of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 and Fortune 1000 
firms, we find that separation of the two leadership roles positively impacts future firm performance 
when current performance is poor, but negatively impacts future firm performance when current 
performance is high. We find that this effect is most dramatic for demotion separations.”). 
 197. E.g., Ryan J. Baxter et al., Enterprise Risk Management Program Quality: Determinants, 
Value Relevance, and the Financial Crisis, 30 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1264 (2013) (finding that 
superior Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is associated with superior accounting performance and 
firm value); Robert E. Hoyt & Andre P. Liebenberg, The Value of Enterprise Risk Management, 78 J. 
RISK & INS. 795 (2011) (finding that insurance firms practicing ERM enjoy a 20 percent valuation 
premium.). 
 198. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. See also Torchia et al., supra note 96 (finding 
that firms with a critical mass of women on the board are more innovative). 
 199. See Becker et al., supra note 21 (finding that sophisticated shareholders value proxy access).  
 200. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, 
23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1089 (2010) (articulating a model of sub-optimal corporate governance based 
upon lobbying resources and incentives and concluding that a CEO primacy model is consistent with 
extant empirical evidence). 
 201. Delaware essentially abolished liability under the duty of care for directors of public firms in 
1987, through the passage of Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 102(b)(7). DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). The synopsis of the bill indicated that the legislature was 
animated by the concerns of the insurance industry. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The 
Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 43 (1989). This 
is odd given that the market value of such insurance companies rose significantly after the Smith v. 
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Corporate leadership has also escaped liability for securities fraud because 
plaintiffs are now required to plead a “strong inference” of scienter 
without the benefit of discovery.
202
 And big business leaders consistently 
exercise political power in a way that deprives shareholders of any real 
voice in the selection of board directors.
203
  
The political power of CEOs reached its zenith in the aftermath of the 
financial market crisis of 2007–09. Despite proof of massive fraud, no 
individual corporate leader faced any real criminal accountability for the 
misconduct underlying the crisis.
204
 In particular, no senior executive of 
any Wall Street bank faced indictment for the wrongdoing that precipitated 
the crisis.
205
 The Department of Justice has failed to accurately justify this 
apparent immunity.
206
 A lack of accountability for the most powerful does 
violence to the rule of law and encourages lawlessness throughout our 
society.
207
 While there may be some colorable basis for declining to 
pursue criminal charges against banks backed by the full faith and credit of 
 
 
Van Gorkom decision. Id. at 74. It appears insurance companies were able to use the decision to 
enhance their premium revenues with little real additional risk. Id. 
 202. Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the 
Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1076, 1084 (1999) (“The . . 
.’reforms’ of private securities litigation are a betrayal of . . . the federal securities laws and expose our 
financial system to risks that are not fully appreciated. A more reactionary cycle could hardly have 
been imagined by the promulgators of the federal securities laws in the early 1930s.”). Most major 
texts at least mention the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in passing while failing to link the 
Act to the massive securities fraud underlying the subprime debacle. See, e.g., EISENBERG & COX, 
supra note 7, at 863–66; O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1030–59; CHOPER ET AL, supra 
note 7, at 407–13. 
 203. The Business Roundtable and the United States Chamber of Commerce—lobbying 
organizations that operate to further the interests of CEOs—recently stymied the SEC’s efforts to give 
shareholders access to management’s proxy for the purpose of participating in the director-selection 
process insofar as proxy voting is concerned. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146–47 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 204. See Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2014) (reviewing evidence of massive 
securities fraud). 
 205. Id. at 723 n.362 (“In early 2013, Frontline investigated ‘why Wall Street’s leaders have 
escaped prosecution for any fraud related to the sale of bad mortgages.’ . . . Among its findings was an 
apparent lack of criminal Grand Jury investigations . . . .”) (citing Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS 
television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/MQ4-6GT6). 
 206. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO 
ADDRESS MORTGAGE FRAUD, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 14–
12, at 29 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/a1412.pdf.) (“The 
Inspector General of the Department of Justice also found that the Department mislead [sic] the public 
with regard to its prosecutorial efforts against financial and mortgage fraud. . . . Thus, the criminal 
response to the frauds underlying the Great Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 has been weaker than 
reported.”). 
 207. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to 
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 871 
(2013). 
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the U.S. government,
208
 there is no basis for individual immunity for top 
financial executives. Moreover, this immunity from prosecution and the 
recklessness that presaged the market crisis are not mentioned in any of 
the leading corporations’ textbooks to date.209 
The irrational deviations from traditional norms described in the 
preceding paragraphs speak volumes about the power of CEOs.
210
 But, 
little to nothing is mentioned in leading business law texts that would 
challenge the new primacy of the CEO. 
V. CORPORATIZATION OF PRISONS AND SCHOOLS 
Also absent in any Business Associations textbook is discussion of the 
disquieting trend whereby traditional governmental functions are turned 
over to profit-seeking firms.
211
 For example, one increasingly popular 
 
 
 208. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 
(2014) (arguing that externalities to prosecutions justify declination of prosecutions of banks). 
 209. While the issues of CEO power and accountability squarely implicate basic corporate 
governance principles, criminal exposure for acts surrounding the financial crisis is arguably less 
central to corporate law. Nevertheless, as an indicator of the political power of CEOs, and the impact 
of that political power on the fabric of basic corporate law, criminal immunity for top executives must 
warrant discussion to some extent. The most likely placement for this discussion is either in sections 
discussing executive compensation or the effort to reduce agency costs within the corporation through 
fiduciary duties. See, e.g., EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 299–314; CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 32–35. Unfortunately, reading these sections of the texts, one would not even know the crisis of 
2007–2009 ever occurred. See also O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1169–75; KLEIN ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 895–928; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 635–39. The Epstein text was published in 
2010, before it became clear that zero criminal prosecutions against personnel at the largest firms 
would occur. 
 210. CEO power thus explains soaring compensation. Prominent economists cannot find any 
performance-related basis for CEO pay. PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334 (“The most convincing proof of 
the failure of corporate governance . . . is that when we collect data about individual firms . . . it very 
difficult to explain the observed variations [in pay] in terms of firm performance.”). See also Piketty et 
al., supra note 44, at 232 (finding that soaring CEO pay resulted from CEO power to set pay 
independently from performance and incentives to exploit lower marginal tax rates).  
 211. Scholars increasingly contest the move of traditionally government functions to the corporate 
space. They argue that corporations do not operate with respect for individual rights but do operate 
without the checks and balances applicable to government actions. E.g., powell & Menendian, supra 
note 8, at 121–24. They are not subject to anti-discrimination laws to the same extent as government 
actors due to the State Action doctrine. See id. at 121–22. Corporations represent highly concentrated 
power, not diffused power like that associated with democracy. As Professors powell and Menendian 
state: 
[C]orporations make good servants, but bad masters. To paraphrase Rawls, we can have 
either a corporatist welfare state or democracy, property respecting state. The rapid expansion 
of corporate prerogative and growth of corporate space is not only a threat to individual 
liberty and democratic accountability, it is a threat to the broadest public good. The 
concentration of wealth and influence in corporate form is an increasingly evident structural 
distortion in our economy and our politics. 
Id. at 123. 
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privatization trend involves the transfer of the operation or ownership of 
correctional facilities from local, state, or federal governments to for-profit 
corporations.
212
 Another significant privatization effort involves for-profit 
companies that operate or manage primary and secondary public 
schools.
213
 These companies control the lives and futures of vulnerable 
constituencies—prisoners and students. These vulnerable individuals serve 
as a source of shareholder wealth. 
At its legal optimum, the public firm aggregates capital from passive 
investors to fund ideas, innovation and entrepreneurial activities.
214
 It fuels 
growth by lowering the cost of capital and eliminating the need for 
expensive capital intermediation.
215
 There are, however, limits to the 
activities society should wish to capitalize through the economic benefits 
of the public firm.
216
 Some activities do not warrant a lower cost of capital, 
nor high-powered lobbying and electioneering efforts, as there exists a 
zone of activities that may be best left to public funding.
217
 
A. The Prison Industrial Complex 
The prison industrial complex in the U.S. illustrates this limit.
218
 The 
inherent problems of privatizing traditionally public functions are 
 
 
 212. The privatization of prisons is not a new phenomenon. In 1995, seven percent of the 
operators of state and federal facilities were private contractors. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995, at 2 (1997). Typically, 
one company “is responsible for everything that goes on in the prison, from the food that’s served and 
the vocational courses that are taught to the discipline that’s meted out to inmates.” Penelope Lemov, 
Jailhouse Inc., GOVERNING MAGAZINE, May 1993, at 44. Lemov described one of the prison 
companies, Corrections Corporation of America, and the fact that it sold its stock on a major stock 
exchange. See id. 
 213. For-profit companies have also been retained to distribute social services program benefits. 
See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES 
CHALLENGES IN ENDURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS (1997) (examining the policy 
implications of privatization of social services for children).  
 214. See RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 51. 
 215. Id. at 49–51. 
 216. In decades past, corporate law textbooks addressed the limitations and restrictions imposed 
upon corporate activities by states. E.g., WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 5–12 (5th ed. unabridged 1980). As Justice Brandeis recognized, these 
restrictions were based upon “apprehension of corporate domination.” Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 
288 U.S. 517, 549, 555 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that traditionally corporations only 
existed for a limited number of purposes and their powers were “sparingly conferred and strictly 
construed”). 
 217. This is particularly so in the wake of Citizens United. See supra Part III. We explain the 
reasons why certain government functions are best left to the public sector in the subsections that 
follow. 
 218. See Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison Industrial 
Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589, 589 (2012) (“The Prison Industrial Complex . . . is a profiteering 
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particularly evident in the context of carceral policy.
219
 Should passive 
investors profit from incarcerating fellow citizens? Should society 
capitalize incarceration through the capital aggregation power of the 
public firm? Is the use of the public firm to operate prisons acceptable, 
particularly in light of the enhanced political power of the firm to 
influence legislation and incarceration policies? 
Consider the following facts. The U.S. currently incarcerates more 
citizens than any nation on earth,
220
 outpacing such autocratic regimes as 
China, Russia and Rwanda.
221
 African Americans suffer disproportionately 
from this excessive incarceration rate, accounting for more than forty 
percent of the nation’s inmates but only thirteen percent of the 
population.
222
 This stunning percentage is exacerbated when you consider 
that most incarcerated African Americans are males. Nearly one in three 
African-American males can now expect to face some time in prison.
223
 
Latino males similarly make up large percentages of the U.S. prison 
population even though they make up a much smaller percentage of our 
nation’s citizenry.224 Additionally, the federal government holds 
approximately 34,000 immigration law violators in detention facilities that 
 
 
system fueled by the economic interests of private corporations, federal and state correctional 
institutions, and politicians.”). See also Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, THE 
ATLANTIC, Dec. 1998, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison-
industrial-complex/304669/ (“The prison-industrial complex is not only a set of interest groups and 
institutions. It is also a state of mind. The lure of big money is corrupting the nation’s criminal-justice 
system, replacing notions of public service with a drive for higher profits.”).  
 219. andré douglas pond cummings, “All Eyez On Me”: America’s War on Drugs and the Prison-
Industrial Complex, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 417, 419 (2012) (“The ‘tough on crime’ political 
posturing and War on Drugs rhetoric have further led to an eruption in prison profiteering, in what has 
come to be known, per Angela Davis, Cornel West, and Talib Kweli, as the ‘prison-industrial 
complex.’”). 
 220. Michael B. Kelley & Christina Sterbenz, This World Map Shows the Enormity of America’s 
Prison Problem, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:58 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/world-
map-of-incarceration-rates-2014-1#ixzz2vyEV26eA.  
 221. Fulcher, supra note 218, at 591. 
 222. Michael B. Kelley, 13 Signs That America’s Prison System Is out of Control, BUS. INSIDER 
(Apr. 12, 2012, 1:40 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/9YAK-JUD8.  
 223. Saki Knafo, 1 in 3 Black Males Will Go to Prison in Their Lifetime, Report Warns, HUFF. 
POST (Oct. 4, 2013, 3:24 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/TN6-H56J.  
 224. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR% 
20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf (“If current trends continue, one of every three 
black American males born today can expect to go to prison in his lifetime, as can one of every six 
Latino males—compared to one of every seventeen white males.”).  
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are often privately operated.
225
 Essentially, mass incarceration operates to 
create a new caste system of deeply disempowered minorities in the 
U.S.
226
 
Public corporations profit from America’s incarceration folly,227 and it 
is natural for these firms to lobby lawmakers and make campaign 
contributions to further their economic interests.
228
 Large private for-profit 
prison corporations spend dozens of millions of dollars annually to lobby 
for draconian sentencing penalties for crimes.
229
 They also lobby 
lawmakers to hunt for “new” crimes that will result in incarceration.230 For 
private prison profiteers, the name of the game is head count.
231
 Their goal 
is to increase the number of heads that hit mattresses each night in their 
private carceral facilities.
232
 In this way, it appears that private prison 
 
 
 225. William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress Mandates Jail Beds for 34,000 Immigrants 
as Private Prisons Profit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:01 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
C3NM-TJJK. 
 226. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 4 (2010) (“Quite belatedly, I came to see that 
mass incarceration in the United States had, in fact, emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-
disguised system of racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim 
Crow.”). 
 227. See Joe Weisenthal, This Investor Presentation for a Private Prison Is One of the Creepiest 
Presentations We’ve Ever Seen, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2012, 1:06 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
E8PS-CDEP.  
 228. PAUL ASHTON & AMANDA PETTERUTI, JUSTICE POLICY INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW 
THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION 
POLICIES 22 (2011), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/ 
gaming_the_system.pdf (explaining that private prison companies like CCA, GEO Group, and Cornell 
Corrections have hired thirty lobbyists, in Florida alone, to promote their prison interests). Further, 
CCA has given over $900,000 annually to federal candidates since 2003, and the prison companies 
have given more than $16 million to state and federal legislators since 2000—evidence that states are 
some of the private prison companies’ most important clients. Id. at 22, 24. See also Lee Hall, Nomads 
Under the Tent of Blue: Migrants Fuel the U.S. Prison Industry, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 265, 308 
(2004) (explaining how private prison lobbyists exercise influence); Clifford J. Levy, Prison Company 
Faces Fine on Gaps in Lobbying Records, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at B5.  
 229. Cassandre Monique Davilmar, Note, We Tried to Make Them Offer Rehab, but They Said, 
“No, No, No!”: Incentivizing Private Prison Reform Through the Private Prisoner Rehabilitation 
Credit, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 n.79 (2014) (“Private prison companies have aggressively 
promoted public policies that tend to increase revenues for private prisons.”). 
 230. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS 
INCARCERATION 38 (2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_ 
20111102.pdf; Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833741 (describing how CCA hired 
lobbyists to influence the Arizona legislature to pass a new law to increase prison populations). 
 231. See Davilmar, supra note 229, at 282 (noting that short term cost reductions lead to higher 
recidivism and a greater prison population for private exploitation); ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 
228, at 9–12 (describing how private prison corporations promote policies that lead to greater numbers 
of prisoners incarcerated which leads to larger profits for the corporation and its shareholders). 
 232. Davilmar, supra note 229, at 282 (“For society to benefit from private prisons, it must 
demand more than a short-term, convenient solution to the prison problem. Otherwise, if prison 
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corporations are perversely incentivized to increase human suffering in the 
name of profit maximization and greed.
233
 
Disturbingly, the private prison corporation manufactures nothing, 
provides no genuinely valuable service, and simply acts as a conduit to 
transfer taxpayer funds from government coffers into the hands of 
shareholders and corporate executives.
234
 Private prison companies exist 
primarily through government contracts that call upon them to warehouse 
city, state, and federal prisoners.
235
 They siphon off taxpayer funds without 
manufacturing or providing anything truly useful.
236
 Private prison 
executives sell their services to governments and municipalities by 
promising more efficiently run prisons and lower costs, but recent studies 
indicate that private prisons are run less efficiently, less safely, and less 
cost-effectively than are government-run prisons.
237
 Moreover, private 
 
 
corporations are allowed to focus solely on short-term cost-reduction, their long-term revenue stream 
will continue to increase to the detriment of society.”). 
 233. See andré douglas pond cummings, Private Prison Profiteering, CONCURRING OPINIONS 
(Feb. 22, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/J7WX-MMN3 (describing the lobbying efforts of private 
prison for-profit business leaders to increase prison populations in order to increase shareholder 
profits). 
 234. As Senator Robert F. Kennedy emphasized, in a 1968 speech at the University of Kansas, not 
all economic activity enhances social welfare: 
Gross National Product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear 
our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for the people who 
break them. It counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in 
chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the police 
to fight the riots in our cities. It counts Whitman’s rifle and Speck’s knife, and the television 
programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet the gross national 
product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy 
of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the 
intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither 
our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our 
devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life 
worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are 
Americans. 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Speech at the University of Kansas (Mar. 18, 1968), 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/RFK-Speeches/Remarks-of-Robert-
F-Kennedy-at-the-University-of-Kansas-March-18-1968.aspx. Though prisons add to gross domestic 
product, they may substract from the general welfare of the nation. 
 235. RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 21 (“Excessive prison expenditures may enhance short-term 
growth, but only at the cost of any reasonable measure of aggregate social happiness-a society that 
imprisons many of its citizens suffers from either an abnormally high concentration of dangerously 
violent people (unlikely) or an out-of-whack criminal justice system.”).  
 236. See Robert J. Gordon, Two Centuries of Economic Growth: Europe Chasing the American 
Frontier 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10662, 2004), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10662 (arguing that excessive prison expenditures in U.S. masks (in 
part) inferior U.S. productivity relative to Europe). 
 237. CORRECTIONAL INST. INSPECTION COMM. REP. ON THE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION OF 
THE LAKE ERIE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Jan. 22–23, 2013, available at http://big.assets. 
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prisons have failed to lower recidivism rates.
238
 So, at its core, the private 
prison company simply exists as a transfer mechanism of taxpayer funds 
from average U.S. taxpayers to private prison shareholders and company 
executives. 
More nefariously, private prison corporations also profit from prison 
labor, essentially engaging in a program of modern day indentured 
servitude.
239
 Increasingly, private prison executives enter into contracts 
with a variety of companies that use prison labor at deep discounts to 
manufacture or develop their products. With companies able to pay 
prisoners significantly less than minimum wage, private prisons profit on 
the backs of those confined in their facilities, while the companies that 
contract for prison labor are able to place a “made in America” tag on their 
products and pay significantly less than minimum wage.
240
 In both 
Georgia and Wisconsin, prisoners are paid nothing for their labor.
241
 They 
are modern day slaves, exploited by the private prison regime. 
Corporations that have profited from prison labor since the inception of 
the private prison corporation include big-name companies like Starbucks, 
McDonalds, IBM, Victoria’s Secret and many others.242  
The for-profit private prison corporation profits by increasing the 
number of American citizens that are incarcerated while simultaneously 
exploiting their labor—perverse behavior that the law currently 
incentivizes.
243
 To increase profits, corporate leadership of private prison 
companies must hope for, even work for, an increase in the number of men 
and women put behind bars in the United States. This work is handsomely 
rewarded as 2011 reports indicate that the two largest private prison 
 
 
huffingtonpost.com/lakeeriereport.pdf; John Burnett, Miss. Prison Operator out; Facility Called a 
‘Cesspool’, NPR (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/24/151276620/firm-leaves-miss-after-
its-prison-is-called-cesspool; David M. Reutter, Florida Provides Lesson in How Not to Privatize State 
Prisons, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/feb/15/ 
florida-provides-lesson-in-how-not-to-privatize-state-prisons/. 
 238. Davilmar, supra note 229, at 276–77.  
 239. Patrice Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of Working 
Inmates, ___ ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. ___ (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 4) (on file with 
authors). 
 240. Id. at 14–15 
 241. See id. at 20 n.110 (citing Rhonda Cook, Inmates Use Technology to Organize State Prison 
Protest, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Dec. 13, 2010, 3:48 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/ 
news/local/inmates-use-technology-to-organize-state-prison-pr/nQnsN/). 
 242. See id. at 32–33. 
 243. See Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New Form of 
Slavery?, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-
united-states-big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289. 
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companies, Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) and the GEO 
Group together earned more than $2.9 billion in profits in 2010.
244
  
It is important to understand how private prison corporations work for 
an increase in the number of persons incarcerated in the United States. The 
CEO, with no supervision and with boards that fail to hold him 
accountable, lobbies state and federal legislatures to increase prison 
construction and increase the flow of clients—prisoners—into the prison 
system. To accomplish this, the CEO has unfettered use of corporate funds 
at his disposal to hire lobbyists and political consultants for electioneering 
and politicking.
245
 
The role of the corporation is to facilitate the flow of capital to 
innovative and entrepreneurial activities, not to create rent seeking from 
the destruction of human capital.
246
 If casebooks included some discussion 
of privatization in general, and the new business of for-profit incarceration 
in particular, students would have the opportunity to think about the role 
of the corporation and the kinds of services that are best committed to 
public supervision. 
B. The Privatization of Public Schools 
For-profit companies that manage and operate primary and secondary 
public schools provide another example of the social impact of the 
corporate sector that all Business Associations casebooks overlook. In the 
early 1990s, educators looked to business leaders to help resolve the 
problem of failing public schools.
247
 Business leaders proposed a market-
 
 
 244.  ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 228, at 2. 
 245. See cummings, supra note 219, at 434–42. 
 246. One natural point for such discussion could be the ultra vires doctrine. Casebooks recognize 
that this doctrine has its roots in the traditionally narrow scope of permissible activities granted to 
corporations. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 249. But they typically fail to try to articulate any 
modern theory defining the proper role for the public corporation, or to discuss the possibility that 
corporations are not ideal for the wholesale displacement of government. Another point where such a 
discussion could occur is with respect to the power of the corporation to make charitable contributions, 
which at one time was considered ultra vires. Id. at 261–67. Instead, texts seem to assume there is no 
longer any theoretical limit to corporatization despite traditional skepticism and apprehension of 
corporatization. See supra note 216. See also CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 19–29, 39–41, 65–69.   
 247. GARY MIRON & CHARISSE GULOSINO, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR., PROFILES OF FOR-PROFIT 
AND NONPROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 1 (Kevin Welner et al. eds., 14th ed. 
2013), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-11-12. See also Vaughan 
Byrnes, Getting a Feel for the Market: The Use of Privatized School Management in Philadelphia, 115 
AM. J. EDUC. 437, 437 (2009) (“[T]he plights facing the U.S. public education system have drawn 
much attention and have been widely documented. This attention has focused predominantly on the 
growing dropout crisis in U.S. high schools . . . [and] the widening achievement gap within U.S. public 
schools between minority and low-income students and their more advantaged counterparts . . . .”). 
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based approach to school reform, and this helped to inspire the emergence 
of education management organizations (“EMOs”).248 The authors of a 
report published by the National Education Policy Center define an EMO 
“as a private organization or firm that manages public schools, including 
district and charter public schools.”249 The authors define for-profit EMOs 
as “businesses that seek to return a profit to the owners or the stockholders 
who invest in them.”250 They note that “[h]istorically, only a small portion 
of EMOs have been nonprofits.”251 
One company, Education Alternatives, Inc., was highly visible in the 
1990s during the early years of school privatization. Education 
Alternatives began its foray into the education business by contracting 
with school boards in Dade County, Florida; Baltimore, Maryland; and 
Hartford, Connecticut.
252
 The company operated and managed several 
public schools, but eventually, all of these contracts were cancelled.
253
 
Soon after the contracts were cancelled, in light of the difficulties 
experienced by Education Alternatives, an article exploring the future of 
for-profit investment in education suggested that school boards be more 
careful when considering future privatization possibilities.
254
 The 
journalists cautioned school officials to inquire about a for-profit 
company’s experience in education, the cost to prepare a contract, and the 
costs of overseeing and appraising a company’s performance.255 
Eventually, Education Alternatives changed its name to The Tesseract 
Group, Inc. As The Tesseract Group, the company owned and operated 
several proprietary private schools and rendered management and 
consulting services to public and private schools. But the company’s 
difficulties continued. In 2000, The Tesseract Group filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.
256
  
In spite of The Tesseract Group’s failure, and the subsequent criticism 
of school privatization, for-profit corporations continue in the business of 
educating children. Some for-profit EMOs organize as corporations, others 
 
 
 248. MIRON & GULOSINO, supra note 247, at 1. 
 249. Id. at 2. 
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at 2–3. 
 252. See The Tesseract Group, Inc., Ann. Rep. (Form 10-K), 4–5 (Sept. 28, 1998). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Deb Riechmann & John Gittelsohn, School Ventures on Hold?, ORANGE CNTY. 
REGISTER, Feb. 2, 1996, at A12. 
 255.  Id. 
 256. School Firm Files for Banruptcy [sic] Protection, PHOENIX BUS. J. (Oct. 9, 2000, 1:51 PM), 
www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2000/10/09/daily7.html. 
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as limited liability companies.
257
 In 2012, for-profit EMOs operated in 35 
U.S. states.
258
 “Each year since 2001–2002 the average enrollment for 
[for-profit] EMO-managed schools has increased.”259 In the 2009–2010 
academic year, 365,000 students attended schools managed by for-profit 
EMOs.
260
 In 2011–2012, 462,926 students attended schools managed by 
for-profit EMOs,
261
 representing a significant increase in the number of 
students who depend on for-profit businesses for their education.
262
 The 
size and number of for-profit EMOs have slowly but steadily increased.
263
 
“In 2011–2012, the total number of schools operated by large for-profit 
EMOs was 840, up from 808 in 2010–2011, an increase of 37 schools.”264 
For-profit EMOs may manage or operate traditional district public 
schools or charter schools. EMOs that manage district public schools do so 
under a contract with local school districts.
265
 EMOs that manage charter 
schools do so pursuant to a contract with the charter holder to manage the 
school on the charter holder’s behalf.266 “Charter holders may include 
academic institutions, nonprofit foundations, and groups of parents, 
teachers, or both.”267 There are states, however, like New York that do not 
allow charter schools to hire for-profit EMOs to manage them.
268
  
There is much disagreement about whether privatizing public schools 
improves education. Those who support for-profit EMOs embrace the 
spirit of entrepreneurship and market-based competition as a way to more 
efficiently attain educational goals.
269
 Their position applies to for-profits 
that manage charter schools as well as for-profits that manage district 
 
 
 257. See MIRON & GULOSINO, supra note 247, at 23–29. 
 258. Id. at i. 
 259. Id. at 12. 
 260. Id. at iv. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 18 (“There are some interesting differences between schools operated by for-profit and 
nonprofit EMOs. For-profit schools are more concentrated at the primary level than are nonprofit 
schools. Across all categories, we find that for-profit schools have much larger enrollments per 
school.”). 
 263. Id. at 5 (“Since the first Profiles report in 1999, the number of for-profit EMOs has increased 
to 97 from 33. The number of states in which EMOs operate has grown to 35 from 16.”). For-profit 
EMOs may operate charter schools or traditional district schools, but the charter schools they manage 
have tended to be significantly larger than charter schools that are not run by for-profits. John F. Witte, 
Is It Privatization or Educational Choice that Matters? Comments on “Market- Versus Mission-
Oriented Charter Schools”, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 1052, 1053 (2004). 
 264. MIRON & GULOSINO, supra note 247, at 8. 
 265. Alex Molnar & David R. Garcia, The Expanding Role of Privatization in Education: 
Implications for Teacher Education and Development, TEACHER EDUC. Q., Spring 2007, at 11, 13. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See S. B. A.11310, 2010 Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.Y. 2010). 
 269. See MIRON & GULOSINO, supra note 247, at 1. 
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schools. Proponents argue that public schools will have to improve 
dramatically in order to compete with charter schools.
270
 According to this 
market-based analysis, public schools that do not improve will not survive 
because they cannot compete with the superior-functioning charter 
schools.
271
 With respect to district schools managed by for-profits, 
privatization proponents believe them to be far more efficiently and 
effectively managed than district schools that are operated by government 
or nonprofit entities.
272
 The enhanced efficiency and effectiveness, 
according to privatization proponents, are attributable to an EMO’s profit 
motive. The companies will profit, shareholders or investors will benefit, 
and future contracts will be available, only if the EMOs manage schools 
efficiently.
273
 Privatization advocates argue that schools managed by for-
profit companies will educate students more efficiently because businesses 
are not laden with the bureaucratic layers that impede innovation within 
government and nonprofit organizations.
274
 Private companies, they argue, 
are better run and more effectively use the resources they have.
275
 Many of 
these same arguments are used to justify prison privatization. 
Opponents of public education privatization also focus on the profit 
motive. Opponents are concerned that “already limited school resources” 
will be “redirected for service fees, profits, or both.”276 EMO managers 
must economize, perhaps at student expense, in order to yield a profit for 
shareholders at some point. Economizing to maximize profits, even if it 
compromises student interests, is required under the prevailing 
 
 
 270. Id. at 2. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. (“A for-profit company contracted to manage district public schools, it is reasoned, will 
have incentives (making a profit in the short term and retaining a profitable contract in the long term) 
to seek efficiencies and improve student outcomes and achievement. The competition, in this context, 
takes place not among schools or districts themselves, but among current or potential managers of 
schools.”). 
 273. Id. See also Molnar & Garcia, supra note 265, at 11 (“Advocates of market approaches to 
education reform contend that creating a market in educational services will foster competition among 
providers and thus spur delivery of better services at the same or lower cost than providing them 
through traditional public schools.”). 
 274. Byrnes, supra note 247, at 438. 
 275. Id. The position of privatization proponents “stem from the very fundamentals of traditional 
capitalist economic doctrine, going back to the core of Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations.” Id. 
Indeed, “[t]he basic ideas of removing government interference in the field of education and allowing 
the natural free market forces such as competition to provide the public consumer with the best 
possible education services are in a sense traditionally American, finding support from the preeminent 
American economist of the twentieth century, Milton Friedman.” Id. 
 276. MIRON & GULOSINO, supra note 247, at 1.  
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interpretation of corporate law.
277
 If a company cuts corners to the 
detriment of students in order to increase profits, parents will be 
displeased and students may be harmed, but shareholders will be 
delighted. When a for-profit EMO cuts corners to maximize profits, it is 
doing what is expected under corporate law, even if the company is not 
doing what is best for the students. In order to be profitable, EMOs may 
“slash . . . per-pupil spending . . . [and] ‘economize’ by increasing class 
sizes, cutting back drastically on special education and eliminating ‘non-
essential’ teachers of art, music and other specialized subjects.”278 Similar 
questions arise when for-profit companies operate prisons. “Does a private 
corporation skimp on food, cut corners on health care, reduce 
rehabilitation activities, or pay its guards less in an effort to squeeze more 
profit out of a prison contract?”279 Emerging evidence suggests that private 
prisons do in fact take these very measures in order to squeeze a profit 
margin out of its prison contracts.
280
 
Opponents of public school privatization are also concerned about the 
problems inherent in “creating another layer of administration.”281 They 
disagree with privatization proponents who claim that for-profit businesses 
reduce bureaucracy and operate more efficiently.
282
 Opponents of school 
privatization are concerned that the business and governance of for-profit 
education companies are not sufficiently transparent.
283
 This concern 
 
 
 277. Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). While Dodge is frequently 
cited to support the notion of shareholder primacy, some commentators believe that the case does not 
compel corporate managerial decision making that always requires the subordination of non-
shareholder interests to those of shareholders, as long as the decision that benefits non-shareholders 
has some connection to corporate profitability. See, e.g., William H. Simon, What Difference Does It 
Make Whether Corporate Managers Have Public Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697, 
1698–99 (1993); Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, New Directions in Corporate Law: 
Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 398 (1993) (“It has been the dominant American conception of the corporation 
for many years that a corporation’s primary goal is, and should be, the maximization of shareholder 
welfare.”); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993) (“[S]hareholder primacy has served as corporate law’s 
governing norm for much of this century.”). 
 278. Beth Wade, The Business of Educating, AM. CITY & CNTY., Jan. 1995, at 24, 27 (quoting the 
President of the National Education Association, Keith Geiger). 
 279. Lemov, supra note 212, at 45. See also Francis Wilkinson, Taking Prisons Private, AM. 
LAW., Nov. 1988, at 101; Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public 
Functions: Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1999) (citing Ira P. Robbins, 
Debate Over Private Prisons Begs Ethical Questions, MANHATTAN LAW., Dec. 11, 1989, at 13) 
(stating that prison privatization “raises major policy, legal and moral questions”). 
 280. See supra note 237. 
 281. MIRON & GULOSINO, supra note 247, at 1. 
 282. Id.  
 283. Id. 
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seems justified by the low response rate of for-profit EMOs to requests for 
basic structure and governance information from the National Education 
Policy Center.
284
 The Center compiles information about the profiles of 
both for-profit and nonprofit companies that manage or operate public 
schools. Seventy-six percent of large for-profit EMOs did not respond to 
the Center’s request for information.285 Seventy-six percent of medium 
for-profit EMOs failed to respond, and ninety-three percent of small for-
profit EMOs ignored the Center’s requests for information.286 
Both proponents and opponents of school privatization present 
convincing arguments. And attempts to establish empirically the benefits 
or disadvantages of school privatization are inconclusive. “Where 
empirical studies have been done on different privatization models, the 
research has been quite mixed, with positive results for privatization in 
some cases and negative results in others.”287 One recent empirical study 
compared public schools to traditional private schools and found that 
public schools are the best providers of educational services.
288
 Where one 
stands in the debate about privatization is not critically important. Critical, 
however, is the fact that the debate about the role of the corporation in 
public functions is not described in any of the leading Business 
Associations casebooks.
289
 
For-profit corporations that assume public functions, such as educating 
children, or imprisoning individuals, are uniquely important. The 
businesses in which they engage have profound effects not only on the 
students and prisoners they purport to serve, but also on society in general. 
The entire nation relies on the adequate provision of the services these 
companies render.  
 
 
 284. Id. at 239. 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. See also Molnar & Garcia, supra note 265, at 19 (“The governance structures of for-profit 
companies are often obscured from public view. Therefore, much of what the public knows about the 
governance of for-profit firms comes from anecdotal accounts.”). 
 287. Byrnes, supra note 247, at 440. 
 288. CHRISTOPHER A. LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LUBIENSKI, THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
ADVANTAGE: WHY PUBLIC SCHOOLS OUTPERFORM PRIVATE SCHOOLS 129–31 (2013) (finding that, 
after accounting for socioeconomic status, race, and other demographic differences among students, 
public school math achievement equaled or outstripped math achievement at every type of private 
school in grades 4 and 8); DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION 
MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1–10 (2013) (“[T]he transfer of public 
funds to private management and the creation of thousands of deregulated, unsupervised, and 
unaccountable schools have opened the public coffers to profiteering, fraud, and exploitation by large 
and small entrepreneurs.”). 
 289. See supra note 246. This is, of course, an outcome dictated by the paltry discussions about 
any limits on corporatization or any discussion challenging the role of the corporation at all in 
contemporary society.  
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The business conducted by for-profit prisons and EMOs has great 
ontological significance. These companies have assumed the most vital 
government functions. The quality of a child’s life, whether she fails or 
succeeds, may depend on how well an EMO performs. There are 
potentially dangerous consequences to the general public when a for-profit 
company fails to consider adequately the interests of prisoners. For-profit 
companies that manage prisons profoundly impact the lives of those they 
incarcerate, and these companies determine their chances of success in the 
future. The work that for-profit prisons and EMOs do “can be the starting 
point, the fountainhead, of a life worth living.”290  
For-profit prisons and EMOs “engage in businesses where human 
beings are the source of shareholder profit. When private companies 
manage prisons [and] public schools . . . the inmates [and] students they 
purport to serve become human commodities that are more like the 
widgets manufactured by more typical corporations than they are like the 
constituencies of traditional companies.”291 In this context, students and 
inmates depend on for-profit companies for their critical existential needs. 
The companies depend on the students and inmates for shareholder 
profits.
292
 
The history of the corporation includes a robust discussion of its proper 
role under law.
293
 Traditionally, corporations were required to specify their 
purposes and could not act ultra vires these purposes.
294
 The general-
purpose corporation is a relatively recent innovation dating only to the late 
19th century.
295
 The enhanced political power of the corporation to 
redefine “lawful” business and the encroachment of the public firm upon 
traditionally public functions calls for a re-ignition of that debate. 
Instead, none of this discussion appears in any of the major 
modern/contemporary corporations and business organizations 
textbooks.
296
 No existing textbook mentions privatization of historically 
 
 
 290. Wade, supra note 279, at 340. 
 291. Id. at 325.  
 292. Id. at 330. 
 293. Even as recently as 1971, scholars suggested that corporate activities and powers be limited. 
LATTIN, supra note 32, at 170–79, 201–05. 
 294. Id. at 201–38. 
 295. Id. at 176. 
 296. Texts focus on such archaic issues as the power of the corporation to make charitable 
contributions rather than the proper role of the corporation (notwithstanding chapter titles to the 
contrary). See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 251–68 (discussing the objective and conduct of the 
corporation); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 251–67 (section entitled “The Role and Purposes of the 
Corporation”). Others give even more limited coverage on the power and role of corporations. See 
CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 64–68; O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 156–58, 684–86. 
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public functions. Also ignored is the possibility that privatization is 
potentially motivated by perverse incentives. Nor is there an opportunity 
for law students to explore whether these companies establish or 
implement social policy that is not in accordance with democratic 
principles as reflected in the Constitution, but in accordance with highly 
non-democratic corporate governance law. 
VI. TOO BIG TO FAIL AND THE TWILIGHT OF CAPITALISM 
Yet another undemocratic outcome is the emergence of public firms 
that are Too Big to Fail (“TBTF”). TBTF is the idea that the government 
and taxpayers must expend taxpayer money to support certain financial 
institutions and large public corporations when they suffer financial 
difficulties.
297
 This public support is required, the argument goes, because 
the corporations are big and interconnected, and national and global 
economies would be destroyed if they failed.
298
 The concept of TBTF is 
only briefly mentioned in leading corporate law textbooks today.
299
 
Discussion of the massive government bailouts of TBTF public firms and 
the corporate governance practices that led them to near financial collapse 
is nearly invisible in the business law texts most adopted in law school 
classrooms across the country.
300
  
During the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 the U.S. government 
bailed out large public corporations of all stripes ranging from massive 
investment banks
301
 and the world’s largest insurance company302 to bank 
 
 
 297. During the crisis of 2008–2009 a total of 942 firms received government support from the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) bailouts alone. These firms included banks, mortgage firms, 
insurance companies, investment funds, other financial companies and auto companies. Bailout 
Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last visited July 24, 2014).  
 298. The website of the NASDAQ stock market provides the following definition of TBTF: 
Government practices that protect large banking organizations from the normal discipline of 
the marketplace because of concerns that such institutions are so important to markets and 
their positions so intertwined with those of other banks that their failure would be 
unacceptably disruptive, financially and economically. 
Financial Glossary: Too Big to Fail, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/t/too-big-
too-fail (last visited June 30, 2014). 
 299. The primary bailout in terms of both federal expenditures and political attention was the 
TARP, created under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3788, 3790. The Federal Reserve (“Fed”) made massive emergency loans under section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2012). The FDIC used the bank deposit 
insurance fund to back-up government guarantees of bank asset values and to guarantee bank debt 
under the so-called systemic risk exception to its otherwise limited statutory authority. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1823(c) (2012). 
 300. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1169. 
 301. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Rescue Me: A Fed Bailout Crosses a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
16, 2008, at BU1 (detailing Fed bailout of Bear Stearns). Ultimately, the Fed actually subsidized the 
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holding companies
303
 and automobile manufacturers.
304
 The government’s 
ad hoc approach to using taxpayer funds to bail out massive public firms 
whose leadership had failed left the most seasoned economists 
befuddled.
305
 The only common element to these ad hoc bailouts was the 
inept but politically powerful management of the public corporations that 
accepted government bailout funds.
306
 Today, the megabanks cast an even 
larger shadow over our economy than before the crisis.
307
 
Perhaps nothing illustrated the political power of the modern 
corporation in action more than the astounding U.S. government bailouts 
of the megabanks starting in 2008.
308
 William Poole, Former President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, called the bailouts an “affront” to 
capitalism and our democracy.
309
 The government was so indulgent of 
senior corporate executives during the bailout era that one Nobel-winning 
economist termed the bailouts “ersatz capitalism” meaning “the privatizing 
 
 
merger of Bear Stearns with JPMorgan Chase, which effectively made JP Morgan Chase even bigger. 
Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement on Financing Arrangement of JPMorgan Chase’s 
Acquisition of Bear Stearns (Mar. 24, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/96GH-Y3P7. 
 302. A Nuclear Winter?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2008, at 88. 
 303. For example, in early 2009 the government announced a massive bailout of Bank of 
America. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Federal Reserve and the FDIC Provide Assistance to 
Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/3HDQ-6S85. The government did not 
replace senior management at Bank of America nor reduce their compensation rights. See id. This 
followed a similar bailout at Citigroup. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Joint Statement by 
Treasury, Federal Reserve and the FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KC56-VK3A. Again, the government did not replace senior management nor negotiate 
any reduction in their compensation. See id. 
 304. See Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefited from the Bailout?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1568, 1592–93 
(2011) (exploring differences between auto bailouts and financial institution bailouts). 
 305. See Anna Jacobson Schwartz, Op-Ed., Man Without a Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at 
WK12 (“The market was thus bewildered when the Fed rescued certain firms and not others. Mr. 
Bernanke should have explained the principles behind these decisions. The market could not 
understand why the Fed rescued Bear Stearns and then permitted Lehman Brothers to die.”). 
 306. What Were They Smoking?, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 66. See also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., 
Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A37 (“The point is that the subprime crisis and the 
credit crunch are, in an important sense, the result of our failure to effectively reform corporate 
governance after the last set of scandals.”). 
 307. See Harvey Rosenblum, Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why We Must End Too Big to 
Fail—Now, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 6 exhibit 2 (2012).  
 308. Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1285 
(2014) (“[The megabanks] make up less than one percent of the banks in the country, but control the 
majority of the country’s banking assets and wield a disproportionate amount of political power.”). 
Economist Simon Johnson states the reality well: “Do not deceive yourselves, the fact that Dodd-Frank 
places constraints on the ability of the Fed, the fact that it modifies the emergency powers, the fact that 
it changes other parts of the legal powers and authorities around the financial system does not mean 
that there cannot be and will not be another bailout.” Simon Johnson, Keynote Address: The 
Continuing Problem of “Too Big to Fail”, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 8 (2013). 
 309. Heidi N. Moore, Jumping Into the Regulatory Poole for Banks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2009, 
available at http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/04/03/jumping-into-the-regulatory-poole-for-banks/.  
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of gains and the socializing of losses.”310 Government inquiries conducted 
by oversight panels later concluded that the bailouts amounted to 
giveaways of taxpayer wealth to the megabanks and to their corporate 
leadership.
311
 Why would government leaders consider no alternative other 
than to bail out the very corporations that brought the economy to the 
brink of disaster? Business law textbooks fail to discuss these issues, 
thereby failing to give law students an opportunity to consider an 
economic policy that posits that banks are so large and “important” to the 
economy that their collapse threatens the entire global marketplace.
312
 
Even though many alternatives were available, the U.S. government 
attempted to resolve the financial crisis by choosing a bailout strategy 
most favorable to senior corporate managers at the firms most responsible 
for the crisis.
313
 One prominent economist suggested forming new banks 
with the funds used to bailout the megabanks because the new banks could 
continue to lend based upon “pristine balance sheets” unencumbered by 
toxic assets.
314
 Other alternatives included bankruptcy protection for the 
failed megabanks or even allowing megabank failure, letting the market 
work where the reckless and mismanaged firms could be absorbed by 
stronger and better-managed firms.
315
 In truth, no alternative avenue was 
seriously considered by the government other than the full-scale bailout of 
Wall Street banks and firms that effectively redistributed losses from 
private firms to taxpayers.
316
 
 
 
 310. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Op-Ed., Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A31 
(arguing that privatizing gains and socializing losses amounts to “ersatz capitalism”). 
 311. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY’S 
ACQUISITIONS 4 (Feb. 6, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/JUM7-NUF6 (presenting a valuation study 
of the ten largest TARP transactions and concluding that “[o]verall, in the ten transactions, for each 
$100 spent, the Treasury received assets worth approximately $66.”).  
 312. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the Fin. Policy Comm., On 
Being the Right Size, Speech at the Institute of Economic Affairs’ 22nd Annual Series 12–13 (Oct. 25, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/SZ4N-PHA2 (stating that after adjusting for implicit subsidies 
banks over $100 billion do not outperform smaller banks). 
 313. Simon Johnson, TARP: the Long Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L9S6-CQA9 (“TARP was an essential piece of a necessary evil—that is, it saved the 
American financial system from collapse, but it was put in place in a way that was excessively 
favorable to the very bankers who had presided over the collapse. And this sets up exactly the wrong 
incentives as we head into the next credit cycle.”); Carter Dougherty, How Sweden Handled a 
Financial Crisis Without Burdening Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C9 (suggesting that the 
U.S. follow Sweden’s more punitive approach to bailouts). 
 314. Paul Romer, Op-Ed., Let’s Start Brand New Banks, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123388681675555343.  
 315. See, e.g., Guillermo Rosas, Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to 
Banking Crises, 50 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 175, 181 tbl.3 (2006). 
 316. For alternatives not considered by the U.S. government, see US Does Not Have Capitalism 
Now: Stiglitz, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2010, 8:39 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/C24C-UNMG. See 
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The U.S. government provided $23 trillion in commitments to save 
Wall Street firms and other corporations between 2008 and 2009.
317
 Yet, 
without precedent in either U.S. or global history, few senior executives 
lost their job or faced serious investigation as a result of these 
unprecedented bailouts.
318
 The clear takeaway for senior corporate 
executives is that disincentives associated with failure and reckless 
leadership are now diluted.
319
 Further, creditors will provide capital to 
these firms at a lower cost.
320
 With no discipline from the credit markets, 
the firms will take more risk onto their balance sheets.
321
 Ultimately, firms 
not backed by the government’s implied bailout promise cannot compete. 
Only a fragmented financial sector without implied bailout guarantees 
would secure competition.
322
 In short, these megafirm bailouts are 
antithetical to the meritocratic competition that should be central to 
capitalism.
323
 
The bailouts of 2007–2009 stand without precedent. The government 
ultimately guaranteed all of the obligations of the megabanks, including 
compensation arrangements with senior managers.
324
 The government did 
not attempt to negotiate for fair value in exchange for its mammoth 
commitment of taxpayer capital and bailout monies for shareholders, 
 
 
generally Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 471 
(2010) (comparing failure under bankruptcy law to “ad-hoc” rescues chosen by government in 
financial crisis and concluding that government’s approach embedded perverse incentives).  
 317. Dawn Kopecki & Catherine Dodge, U.S. Rescue May Reach $23.7 Trillion, Barofsky Says, 
BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/9SLD-V62U.  
 318. See EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A FAIR DEAL FOR TAXPAYER 
INVESTMENTS 1 (2009), archived at http://perma.cc/7D4J-JZW6 (“92 percent of the management and 
directors of the top 17 recipients of TARP funds are still in office”). 
 319. Rosenblum, supra note 307, at 19 (“In practice, these rescues have penalized equity holders 
while protecting bond holders and, to a lesser extent, bank managers. Disciplining the management of 
big banks, just as happens at smaller banks, would reassure a public angry with those whose reckless 
decisions necessitated government assistance.”). 
 320. See id. at 4 (“Moral hazard reinforces complacency. Moral hazard describes the danger that 
protection against losses encourages riskier behavior. Government rescues of troubled financial 
institutions encourage banks and their creditors to take greater risks, knowing they’ll reap the rewards 
if things turn out well, but will be shielded from losses if things sour.”). 
 321. See Johnson, supra note 308, at 12 (“We just experienced the greatest financial crisis since 
the 1930s because incentives in the financial system encouraged people to take excessive risk, to have 
too little capital, too much leverage, and too much debt relative to thin cushions of equity.”). 
 322. See Rosenblum, supra note 307, at 21 (“A financial system composed of more banks, 
numerous enough to ensure competition in funding businesses and households but none of them big 
enough to put the overall economy in jeopardy, will give the United States a better chance of 
navigating through future financial potholes and precipices.”). 
 323. See id. at 4 (“When competition declines, incentives often turn perverse, and self-interest can 
turn malevolent. That’s what happened in the years before the financial crisis.”). 
 324. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE 
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 11–13 (2010). 
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managers and unsecured creditors alike.
325
 This irresponsible fiscal 
behavior on the part of the government corrodes the economic rule of law 
as ordinary citizens witness the unfair indulgences that are granted to the 
rich and powerful.
326
  
The cost of bailing out TBTF institutions is not limited to actual 
government outlays of taxpayer funds—as massive as those were. The 
hidden and more injurious cost is that this totally non-punitive government 
backstop and fiscal irresponsibility invites excessive risk taking within the 
core of our economy—the financial sector.327 The Great Financial Crisis 
exemplifies this excessive and reckless risk inspired by an implicit bailout 
guarantee. 
Senior executives at major financial corporations contributed to 
causing the crisis by saddling their firms with unprecedented levels of risk 
and risky leverage.
328
 The high-risk mortgages and debt assumed by these 
executives and firms led to immediate short-term profits and positive 
compensation gains for the executives at the cost of economic catastrophe 
for all others.
329
 One commentator termed the debacle “one of the worst 
miscalculations in the annals of risk management.”330 Savvy business and 
finance experts recognized that this risk manipulation for profit resulted in 
part from deeply flawed compensation arrangements for senior 
executives.
331
 TBTF exacerbates these perverse incentives in 
compensation arrangements by assuring that failure and recklessness go 
unsanctioned. Essentially, TBTF means that government insures failures 
 
 
 325. Id. 
 326. Rosenblum, supra note 307, at 4 (“[C]ompetition and the rule of law provide market 
discipline that keeps self-interest in check and steers it toward the social good of producing more of 
what consumers want at lower prices.”). 
 327. Johnson, supra note 308, at 12 (“The cost of any financial crisis is not primarily in the 
emergency provision of capital liquidity by authorities that may or may not be paid back; the cost of 
financial crisis is the loss of jobs and the loss of growth.”). 
 328. E.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 152, at 859–60 (“The financial crisis helps make the case that 
boards should do more monitoring. Corporate behavior in the crisis yielded enormous negative externalities 
for the greater society. Corporations were able . . . [to] incentivize risky behavior that yields negative 
externalities, [so] it seems appropriate that boards do more to prevent the abuse of [limited liability].”).  
 329. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 152, at 259–60 (finding that “the top executive teams of Bear 
Stearns and Lehman” derived billions in compensation, exceeding the value of the executives’ stock 
holdings at the beginning of the period, such that “the bottom-line payoffs of these executives during 
2000–2008 were not negative but rather decidedly positive.”). 
 330. Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 75.  
 331. Raghuram Rajan, Bankers’ Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2008, 4:21 PM), 
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto010920081142101282 (“[U]nless we fix incentives 
in the financial system we will get more risk than we bargain for. Unless bankers offer these better 
explanations, their enormous pay, which has been thought of as just reward for performance, will 
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because there is simply no downside. Recklessness and short-termism are 
incentivized as corporate leadership is wholly insulated from both criminal 
sanction and economic injury.
332
 A more anti-capitalistic approach is 
difficult to imagine. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, despite being hailed as new and improved 
financial sector regulation, does not prohibit the government-sponsored 
bailouts implemented in 2008 and 2009. The Federal Reserve and the 
FDIC can now legally engage in subsidizing the failures that occurred in 
2008–2009. While Dodd-Frank included some minor changes in 
containing the size of the megabanks and a new resolution authority, it is 
very unlikely that either can be actualized.
333
 More importantly, and more 
economically dangerous, the megabanks are much larger today than ever 
before.
334
 Therefore, in the future, Congress may face the same dire 
choices that came before it in the fall of 2008 when, on the eve of an 
election, it faced either a total meltdown of the financial sector or being 
forced to throw nearly $1 trillion in subsidized capital at the financial 
sector to rescue it from demise.
335
 
Law students have no opportunity to consider TBTF and the suggestion 
that it should be neutralized. Casebooks should provide law students with 
an opportunity to explore whether megabanks should be broken-up in 
order to restore proper incentives for board members and senior executive 
officers on Wall Street and working in the financial sector.
336
 One is hard-
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 336. As the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas put it: 
The TBTF institutions that amplified and prolonged the recent financial crisis remain a 
hindrance to full economic recovery and to the very ideal of American capitalism. It is 
imperative that we end TBTF. In my view, downsizing the behemoths over time into 
institutions that can be prudently managed and regulated across borders is the appropriate 
policy response. Only then can the process of “creative destruction”—which America has 
perfected and practiced with such effectiveness that it led our country to unprecedented 
economic achievement—work its wonders in the financial sector, just as it does elsewhere in 
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pressed to find even a mention of TBTF in any of the mainstream 
corporations textbooks most adopted in U.S. law schools.   
Further, while the Great Financial Crisis remains a fairly recent 
occurrence, none of the major corporate law textbooks takes a critical look 
at TBTF or the incentives it created as causes of the mortgage crisis.
337
 
None of the leading corporate law textbooks provides a meaningful 
exploration of the mortgage crisis at all.
338
 With the newest edition of the 
O’Kelley text and the Eisenberg text published in 2014, the Choper text 
published in 2013, the Klein text in 2012, and the most recent edition of 
Epstein published in 2010, all had an opportunity to examine the causes of 
the market meltdown and facilitate a conversation regarding the failure of 
corporate law to protect against the crisis.
339
 But each of the texts fails to 
engage in a critical examination of the financial crisis. It is difficult to 
imagine why, on the heels of the greatest market correction and crisis 
since the Great Depression, modern corporate law textbooks contain no 
examination of the causes of the crisis or the continuing economic danger 
of TBTF. The absence of any genuine analysis of the mortgage crisis, the 
subprime mortgage market collapse and the resultant bailout of TBTF 
megafirms deprives students of critical analyses and information. Students 
are exposed only to textbooks written by authors who seem to be 
apologists for a skewed capitalism that favors the elite and disfavors main 
street citizens. The business law professoriate is failing an entire 
generation of law graduates and lawyers.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
Corporate law textbooks fail to critically assess the entrenchment of 
white male privilege at the commanding heights of the economy, and the 
means by which this is perpetuated. Nor, do they critically assess the new 
political power of the corporation. They provide little perspective on the 
proper role of the corporation. The role of corporate governance in the 
Great Financial Crisis of 2008 also garners little to no attention. TBTF 
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 338. The Epstein text creditably explains the role of leverage and derivatives. EPSTEIN ET AL., 
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appears to be a taboo subject. These are core issues relating to corporate 
governance and the essential nature and purpose of the corporate form in 
our society.  
Whether or not the casebook authors agree with more critical 
perspectives on such issues, we argue that shielding a new generation of 
leaders from such perspectives and important evidence cannot be justified. 
Nobel laureates in economics—like Joseph Stiglitz or Paul Krugman—
assail corporate governance law from the point of view of agency costs 
and CEO power. The proof of the importance of this issue for future 
business leaders is manifest in recent lawmaking and regulatory activity in 
the wake of the financial crisis. Law students and future policymakers 
should be allowed to consider such evidence in thinking about corporate 
law.  
When corporations reap profits from mass incarceration or 
privatization of schools, students should consider the role of the modern 
corporation. Traditionally, this topic formed an essential part of the 
education of tomorrow’s leaders. Students today should be given the same 
opportunity to consider the monolithic demographic make-up of senior 
executive officers and directors at the nation’s most powerful firms, 
particularly in an era of very high economic inequality. The basic 
corporations’ class is the logical locus for such learning. 
Essentially, this Article demonstrates that no author or publisher of a 
recent or longstanding leading corporate law textbook has addressed the 
increasing economic and political power wielded by those in control of the 
public firm, nor has any author confronted the legitimacy of this power 
shift from a policy perspective. The enhanced power of CEOs gets little or 
no mention, and changes in law and regulation that underlie this power 
shift are not identified or analyzed. One can read entire corporate law 
textbooks cover to cover and find little to no mention of TBTF, the role of 
the public corporation in the collapse of capitalism in 2008, the lack of 
diversity in the boardroom, the criminal immunity of some of those in 
control of key financial corporations, or the incentives corporations have 
to destroy the environment, foment war or imprison fellow citizens. This 
failure leads to a critical disservice visited upon aspiring lawyers and 
business leaders in our nation’s law school classrooms. 
If the power of the corporation is too awesome to speak of, if the 
control of CEOs cannot be discussed, and if fundamental values such as 
the environment, freedom and education, and the perverse incentives 
created by corporate governance law and regulation are not part of the 
discourse, then the modern public corporation will be a unique and costly 
threat to society instead of the indispensable prop to modern capitalism 
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that it was created to be. This Article concludes that training tomorrow’s 
leaders and corporate law experts in a more fulsome corporate law that 
includes a power perspective and that questions the proper role of the 
corporation in society ultimately paves the way for the full realization of 
the potential of the public corporation. 
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